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INTRODUCTION 
Brown v. Board of Education1 is a landmark Supreme Court case, one 
of the most important cases the Court has ever decided.2  While scholars 
have debated Brown’s meaning, we believe the case, at bottom, stands for 
racial advancement through the law.  Explicitly going against its own
history of juridical subordination—judicial decision-making that persistently
suppresses the black equality interest in civil rights law3—the Court in 
Brown—by which we mean Brown I4 and not Brown II5—became an
unabashed supporter of racial advancement.  For the first time in its 
history, the Supreme Court saw racial advancement as good social policy.6 
And it believed that a civil rights norm of equal rights, what scholars call
formal equal opportunity, was the best strategy for pursuing racial
advancement.7 
But does formal equal opportunity remain good social policy today?
Are African Americans, or blacks, who were the Court’s primary concern,
1.  Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
2. The case revolutionized racial relations in our society and made our society 
more democratic than it otherwise would have been. See infra Part I.C. 
3. See infra Part II. 
4. Brown, 347 U.S. 483. 
5. In Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955), the Court undercut the 
effectiveness of Brown I by ruling that the defendants need not implement its desegregation
order immediately, but should proceed “with all deliberate speed.”  In making this ruling, 
the Court “sacrificed its integrity in a futile effort at appeasement. . . . Instead of easing 
desegregation, the Supreme Court’s 1955 ‘all deliberate speed’ ruling in Brown II emboldened
southern congressmen and state officials to call for defiance.” ROBERT L. CARTER, A 
MATTER OF LAW: A  MEMOIR OF STRUGGLE IN THE CAUSE OF EQUAL RIGHTS 132, 147 
(2005).  Judge Carter was one of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People (NAACP) lawyers who argued Brown before the Supreme Court. Brown, 347 U.S. 
at 484. 
6. See infra Part I.C.2. 
7. See infra Part II.A. 
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better off today if the Court continues to vindicate formal equal opportunity
in today’s society?  What choices are available to the Court? 
These questions arise from the fact that the racial dynamics of American
society have changed.  They are significantly different today, in our post-
civil rights society, than they were at the time of Brown, 1954.  The 
separate–but–equal doctrine, also known as Jim Crow, which had governed 
race relations since the nineteenth century, ended with the passage of the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972.8  The Civil Rights Movement 
ended around that time as well.9  Today, blacks have experienced 
unprecedented success individually, including the election and reelection 
of a black President of the United States.  Yet, capital deficiencies continue 
to mark the lives of the vast majority of African Americans.10  Although 
formal equal opportunity was seen as an effective and fair response to Jim 
Crow, many scholars today question its soundness in our current racial
environment.11 If Brown in spirit stands for racial advancement through the
Supreme Court’s vindication of the black equality interest in civil rights 
cases—in other words, the avoidance of juridical subordination—then
formal equal opportunity may not be a sound post-civil rights theory on which
the Court should rely.  It may, in fact, be a racially subordinating norm. 
That is, however, a difficult determination to make.  There is more than 
one way to define the black equality interest in civil rights law.  This was 
so even in 1954. Brown’s civil rights theory of formal equal opportunity
tendered two potentially competing definitions of the black equality
interest—racial omission and racial integration.12  In this post-civil rights
period, other constructions of the black equality interest have emerged— 
racial solidarity and social transformation—to present formidable challenges 
to formal equal opportunity.13  Many, if not most, civil rights scholars
today subscribe to either of these definitions.14 
The purpose of this Article is to play out the various conceptualizations 
of the black equality interest in post-civil rights America.  How is the 
8. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103
(1973) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to -17 (2012)). 
9. See ROY L. BROOKS, RACIAL JUSTICE IN THE AGE OF OBAMA, at xii (2009). 
10. See id. at 125–82. 
11. See infra Part II.B.1. 
12. See infra Part II.A. 
13. See infra Part II.B. 
14. This is our estimate based on casual discussions with other civil rights scholars, 
the many scholarly conferences critical theorists hold each year, and a perusal of the civil
rights articles written each year. 
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claim of juridical subordination manifested in current Supreme Court 
cases, and what might civil rights law look like if the Court were to avoid 
juridical subordination? Our ambition is not to analyze every landmark
Supreme Court civil rights case—page limitations prevent us from doing 
that—but to provide a framework for analysis, setting the table for the 
juridical subordination inquiry.  Furthermore, we do not here attempt to
reconcile the disparate ways in which the black equality norm is defined, 
because that might preempt important discussion that needs to take place 
before any such attempt is made.15 
We begin with a discussion of the Supreme Court’s inglorious racial 
history, which forms the backdrop for the Brown opinion, and then
proceed to a discussion of the Brown opinion itself (Part I). The former
discussion not only lays the foundation for our assessment of the
motivation behind the Court’s desegregation ruling in Brown, but also 
educates those who live with the misconception that the Supreme Court 
has been an unwavering champion of racial advancement.  It has not; 
hence the strict scrutiny it receives to this day from civil rights scholars. 
Finally, we discuss the elements of juridical subordination—the black
equality interest and implementing law—looking at both the civil rights 
and post-civil rights periods (Part II). 
I. THE SPIRIT OF BROWN 
A. The Supreme Court’s Inglorious Racial History 
The post-Civil War amendments to the Constitution—the Thirteenth 
Amendment,16 Fourteenth Amendment,17 and Fifteenth Amendment18— 
give evidence of the American people’s—the Union’s—commitment to
 15. See infra Conclusion.
 16. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.  Section One of the Thirteenth Amendment abolished
slavery in the United States, and Section Two gives Congress the power to enforce Section
One through legislation. Id.
 17. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.  Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment declares
that “[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.  No State 
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.”  Id. § 1.  Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment gives
Congress the power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment through legislation.  Id. § 5. 
18. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.  Section One of the Fifteenth Amendment declares 
that a citizen may not be denied the right to vote based on race, color, or previous condition
of servitude. Id. § 1. Section Two gives Congress the power to enact legislation to enforce 
Section One.  Id. § 2.
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racial equality during the postbelleum period.19  So difficult and burdensome 
is the passage of a constitutional amendment, requiring a two-thirds 
majority in both the House and Senate plus ratification by three-quarters 
of the state legislatures,20 that, more than the enactment of a statute,21 it
reflects the most serious attention and consideration the American people 
can give to law making.  The national dedication to racial equality after 
the Civil War is futher indicated by the passage of a series of
postamendment federal statutes designed to enforce the Reconstruction 
19. By Lincoln’s Second Inauguration, the purpose of the Civil War for the North
had changed from a war to save the Union to one to end slavery. See generally JAMES M. 
MCPHERSON, FOR CAUSE AND COMRADES: WHY MEN FOUGHT IN THE CIVIL WAR (1997) 
(noting that the soldier vote overwhelmingly supported abolition when Lincoln was
reelected).  Union soldiers returning from the South had reported the horrors of slavery to
their fellow citizens, and many soldiers reenlisted. See generally id.  The defeated South, 
which had rejected black rights, was forced to rejoin and to embrace the ideal of racial 
advancement; hence, the Reconstruction Amendments.  For example, “Illinois, so notorious for
antiblack racism before the war and anti-emancipation legislation during the war, repealed 
its ‘Black Laws’ in 1865 and was the first state to ratify the new Thirteenth Amendment.” 
ALLEN C. GUELZO, LINCOLN’S EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION: THE END OF SLAVERY IN 
AMERICA 232–33 (2004). At the time of his death, Lincoln believed in racial equality, and
the nation through the enactment of the Reconstruction Amendments had followed him to 
that position. See id. at 250. 
20. U.S. CONST. art. V. 
21. Before being passed into law, statutes are bills.  The Legislative Process, U.S. 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, http://www.house.gov/content/learn/legislative_process/ 
[http://perma.cc/KGF6-FHHK] (last visited Nov. 5, 2015).  Bills may originate in either 
the House of Representatives or the Senate, and a representative or senator must sponsor
the bill. Id.  Next, a committee is assigned to review the bill.  Id.  If the committee releases
the bill, it is voted on by members of the Congressional house in which it originated. Id. 
If the bill passes by a simple majority, the bill then moves to the other Congressional house 
where it is reviewed by another committee and voted upon if released by that committee. 
Id.  If the bill passes by a simple majority in that house, members of both the Senate and
House of Representatives work together to create the final bill by fixing differences in the 
versions of the bill passed by each house.  Id.  The final product is again voted on by
members of the House of Representatives and the Senate.  Id.  If passed by a simple
majority in both houses, the bill is sent to the President, who may sign the bill into law or
veto it within ten days. Id.; see also CHARLES W. JOHNSON, HOW OUR LAWS ARE MADE, 
H.R. DOC. NO. 108–93 (2003) (outlining the steps of federal law making). 
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Amendments.  These criminal22 and civil23  statutes empowered the federal 
courts to hold individuals and institutions accountable to the amended 
Constitution. Like the Reconstruction Amendments, these early civil
rights statutes informed the civil rights statutes enacted during the 1960s
22. Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 241 (2012) to offer some protection to African 
Americans from intimidation and attack by white supremacist groups.  Section 241 made 
it illegal for two or more people to “conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any
person” for exercising a federal right.  Id.  The punishment for violating section 241 
included monetary fines and up to ten years in prison or life imprisonment if the criminal
act resulted in death.  See Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, §§ 4–6, 16 Stat. 140, 141
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 241 (2012)).  Congress also enacted 18 U.S.C. § 242 
(2012), which prohibited a person from willfully depriving any person in any state,
territory, commonwealth, or district of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or
protected by the Constitution or federal laws.  Those who violate section 242 face jail time 
or fines.  18 U.S.C. § 242 (2012); see also ROY L. BROOKS ET AL., THE LAW OF
DISCRIMINATION: CASES AND PERSPECTIVES 744 (2011) (discussing sections 241 and 242). 
23. Congress passed section one of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which provided
that every person born in the United States, regardless of race or color, has the same right 
within the United States to make and enforce contracts; to sue and be sued; to give 
evidence in court; to inherit, purchase, sell, lease, or convey real and personal property; 
and to receive full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings as are enjoyed by white 
citizens.  Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (reenacted by the Enforcement Act 
of 1870, ch. 114, §§ 16, 18, 16 Stat. 140, 144 and codified as slightly amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 (2012)).  The right to “inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and
personal property” was additionally protected by codification as 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2012); 
see also BROOKS ET AL., supra note 22, at 289 (discussing section 1982). 
Additionally, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012), originally section one of the 1871 Civil Rights 
Act (passed three years after the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment) provides a civil
remedy for persons deprived of their rights.  Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 
13, 13. The statute states that “[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the 
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress[.]”  42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).  Congress also 
enacted section 1985(3) as part of the 1871 Civil Rights Act.  Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 
22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13, 13–14.  Section 1985(3) allows the recovery of damages from persons 
who conspired to deprive “any person or class of persons of equal protection of the laws, 
or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws.”  42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (2012); see
also Roy L. Brooks, Use of the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1871 to Redress Employment 
Discrimination, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 258, 258–66 (1977) (discussing the history and 
implementation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3), and 1981).  Further, Congress enacted the 
Civil Rights Act of 1875, which prohibited racial discrimination in juries, schools, 
transportation, and public accommodations.  Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 
335, 336. For a discussion of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, see 
Aderson Bellegarde François, The Brand of Inferiority: The Civil Rights Act of 1875, White 
Supremacy, and Affirmative Action, 57 HOW. L.J. 573 (2014). 
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Civil Rights Movement.24 None of this seemed to matter to the Supreme 
Court.
Rather than treating the Reconstruction civil rights laws as a bulwark of
racial justice, the Supreme Court used these laws to shackle the recently 
emancipated enslaved to second-class citizenship.  Indeed, the  Court’s 
civil rights jurisprudence had changed little from the antebellum period
and would remain essentially the same until liberated by Brown v. Board 
of Education in 1954. Throughout the South and, to a lesser extent, in 
other regions of the country, blacks could not attend the best public 
schools, use the cleanest public restrooms or drinking fountains, occupy
the best seats on streetcars or in theatres, vote in elections, or sit on 
juries.25  Blacks were accorded neither due process nor equal protection 
of the laws. Segregation and racial discrimination were so widespread 
across the nation that they can hardly be called aberrations of the South.
They were part of our national legal narrative, largely written by the Supreme 
Court.26  As Lawrence Goldstone observes: 
The descent of the United States into enforced segregation, into a nation where 
human beings could be tortured and horribly murdered without trial, is a story
profoundly tragic and profoundly American.  And the Supreme Court was a 
central player in the tale.27 
Was the Court’s complicity in the subversion of racial equality the work 
of a few rogue justices, a judicial irregularity, or was it an ongoing pattern
and practice of judicial decision-making at the highest reaches of our 
judiciary?28 There were simply too many cases both predating and 
postdating the Reconstruction civil rights laws to call the Court’s sabotage 
24. See United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 790, 805–06 (1966) (holding that the 
defendants, a sheriff and his coconspirators, could be convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 241 for 
depriving three victims of their federal due process rights by the sheriff’s releasing the 
victims from jail in the middle of the night, so that the coconspirators could intercept the 
victims as they attempted to leave the area, assault them, and shoot them to death); BROOKS
ET AL., supra note 22, at 849–50 (explaining how the Supreme Court reinvigorated 42
U.S.C. § 1983 in 1961 in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, and reinvigorated 42 U.S.C. §
1985(3) in 1971 in Griffin v. Breckinridge, 403 U.S. 88). 
25. See Leland Ware & Theodore J. Davis, Ordinary People in an Extraordinary 
Time: The Black Middle-Class in the Age of Obama, 55 HOW. L.J. 533, 533–34 (2012). 
26. See, e.g., JASON SOKOL, ALL EYES ARE UPON US: RACE AND POLITICS FROM
BOSTON TO BROOKLYN, at xxii–xxvi (2014) (showing that northerners supported high-
achieving blacks individually but opposed civil rights for blacks collectively). 
27. LAWRENCE GOLDSTONE, INHERENTLY UNEQUAL: THE BETRAYAL OF EQUAL RIGHTS 
BY THE SUPREME COURT, 1865–1903, at 12 (2011). 
28. See id. at 13.
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 a judical hiccup.  The historical record leads to no other 
1. Dred Scott v. Sandford 
Dred Scott v. Sandford,29 a case that predates the post-Civil War laws, 
is without a doubt the most infamous of the Court’s decisions.  To 
understand Dred Scott, as well as the jurisprudence of racial justice the 
Supreme Court could have imbibed, one must first understand a famous 
English precedent, Somerset v. Stewart,30 written by the distinguished 
English jurist Lord Mansfield. 
James Somerset was an enslaved American brought to England by his 
master, Charles Stewart.31  The slave escaped and was recaptured, setting 
off a long period of litigation regarding his status.32  Lord Mansfield ruled 
that slavery was “[s]o high an act of dominion, . . . so odious, that nothing 
can be suffered to support it, but positive law.”33  Finding no positive
law—no statutory law—in England authorizing slavery, the court set
Somerset, the slave, free.34  But the significance of the ruling extends
beyond the facts of the case.  The court established the precedent in 
Anglo-American law that a slave became free upon coming into a
nonslaveholding jurisdiction because of the absence of positive law 
authorizing slavery therein.35 
Fast forward to the Dred Scott case. In this 1856 case, a runaway slave 
took up residency in the “free” state of Illinois.36  Once there, he invoked 
the Somerset precedent. Rather than deciding the substantive issue, Chief
Justice Taney, writing for the Supreme Court, decided the case on
procedural grounds, ruling that Dred Scott, even though he resided in 
Illinois for four years, was not a citizen of the state and, hence, could not 
29. 60 U.S. 393 (1856), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIV. 
30.  (1772) 98 Eng. Rep. 499; Lofft. 1. 
31. Id.
 32. Id.
 33. Id. 
34. Id. at 510, Lofft. At 19.  For further discussion of Lord Mansfield’s opinion, 
see, for example, STEVEN M. WISE, THOUGH THE HEAVENS MAY FALL: THE LANDMARK
TRIAL THAT LED TO THE END OF HUMAN SLAVERY 179–82 (2005). 
35. See, e.g., ALFRED W. BLUMROSEN & RUTH G. BLUMROSEN, SLAVE NATION: 
HOW SLAVERY UNITED THE COLONIES & SPARKED THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 11–12 
(2005) (explaining the lack of enthusiasm in England for slaveholding at the time of 
Somerset); A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE
AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS: THE COLONIAL PERIOD 313–68 (3d prtg. Aug. 1978) (describing
Somerset’s holding that freedom is the default). 
36.  Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 431 (1856). 
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invoke the federal court’s diversity jurisdiction.37  In other words, the 
federal courts lacked authority to decide the case.  To cut off the prospect
of Dred Scott suing in state court, the Supreme Court went on to rule sua 
sponte that blacks were “regarded as beings of an inferior order . . . unfit
to associate with the white race” and, as such, “they had no rights which 
the white man was bound to respect.”38  The Court concluded, “the negro 
might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit.”39  These
words come from the highest court in the land.  The Court’s ruling not
only precluded an action from being filed in state court, but it also
overturned the Missouri Compromise of 1820, which had divided new 
states between slave and free states, on the ground that it violated Fifth 
Amendment substantive due process rights by allowing a slave to shed his 
status as property upon stepping into a free state.40  Taken together,
Somerset and Dred Scott underscore an essential teaching about Anglo-
American law—to wit, law is less a body of rules than a state of mind. 
Starting in the late nineteenth century, the Supreme Court issued decision
after decision crippling rights African Americans had just acquired under 
the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments.41  With few 
exceptions, the civil rights decisions issued prior to Brown v. Board of
Education established and exposed the Supreme Court’s inglorious racial 
history.42
 37. Id. at 427. 
38. Id. at 407. 
39. Id. at 408. 
40. Id. at 452.  For further discussion, see BLUMROSEN & BLUMROSEN, supra note 
35, at 249–51. See generally  DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS
SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS (1978) (examining in depth “the most famous 
of all American judicial decisions”). 
41. See, e.g., Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 486, 488 (1903) (upholding the 
application of state law to bar African Americans from voting); Williams v. Mississippi, 
170 U.S. 213, 225 (1898) (holding literacy tests and poll taxes constitutional); Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550–51 (1896) (finding separate–but–equal facilities constitutional), 
overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494–95 (1954); The Civil Rights Cases, 
109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883) (invalidating the Civil Rights Act of 1875); United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 554 (1875) (overturning convictions of white supremacists); 
United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1875) (holding act penalizing denial of the right 
to vote unconstitutional). 
42. Between 1875 and 1954—the year it decided Brown v. Board of Education— 
the Supreme Court issued a limited number of positive civil rights decisions.  See, e.g., 
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71, 73 (1932) (reversing the criminal convictions and 
death sentences of nine African American males convicted of rape and holding that a trial 
court’s failure to give defendants charged with capital offenses reasonable time to secure 
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2. United States v. Cruikshank 
In United States v. Cruikshank, the Supreme Court undermined African 
Americans’ ability to protect themselves against injustices committed by 
private citizens.43  The Court was called upon to review the criminal 
convictions of three white defendants who had been found guilty of 
violating the Enforcement Act of 1870, also known as the First Ku Klux 
Klan (KKK) Act.44  The defendants had participated in a brutal attack on 
African Americans in what became known as the “Colfax Massacre.”45 
This massacre took place in Louisiana,46 only three years after ratification 
of the last of the Reconstruction Amendments, the Fifteenth Amendment,47 
and was instigated by the events following Louisiana’s widely contested
1872 gubernatorial election.48 Both the Republican and Democratic candidates 
claimed to have won the election.49  To the chagrin of white Democrats
and the delight of African Americans, a Republican federal judge determined 
the Republican candidate, William P. Kellogg, was the victor.50  In rebellion, 
a group of white Democrats, including many white supremacists, seized
counsel or to appoint effective counsel violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1880) (holding unconstitutional 
West Virginia’s statute that categorically excluded African Americans from serving on
juries purely based on their race), abrogated by Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 536 
n.19 (1975). 
43. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542. 
44. See infra note 56 for the relevant portion of the Act. 
45. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 544–45; GOLDSTONE, supra note 27, at 91 (citing United 
States v. Cruikshank, 25 F. Cas. 707, 708) (C.C.D. La. 1874) (No. 14,897)). 
46. GOLDSTONE, supra note 27, at 88. 
47. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (stating that “[t]he right of citizens of the United 
States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on 
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”).  The Fifteenth Amendment 
was ratified on February 3, 1870. 
48. GOLDSTONE, supra note 27, at 88; see also JOHN R. HOWARD, THE SHIFTING 
WIND: THE SUPREME COURT AND CIVIL RIGHTS FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO BROWN 94
(1999) (“The apocalypse at Colfax had grown out of the ongoing struggle for political 
control of the South.  Local white sentiment strongly supported the Democratic Party and 
a vision of the racial order[,] which subordinated blacks to white domination.  In pursuit 
of this vision, white factions had resorted to violence.”). 
49. GOLDSTONE, supra note 27, at 88. Immediately following the passage of the 
Reconstruction Amendments, Republican candidates committed to racial advancement 
were elected and took over the government in Louisiana.  Kevin Boyle, White Terrorists, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/18/books/review/Boyle­
t.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 [http://perma.cc/LER6-VWQG]. White Democrats responded
by threatening and brutally attacking black and white Republicans in order to keep them 
from voting in the 1872 gubernatorial election. Id.
 50. GOLDSTONE, supra note 27, at 88.  President Grant authorized federal troops to 
enforce the federal order that Kellogg be seated as Louisiana’s governor and to protect the 
new Republican government. CHARLES LANE, THE DAY FREEDOM DIED: THE COLFAX 
MASSACRE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE BETRAYAL OF RECONSTRUCTION 13 (2008). 
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the Colfax courthouse in an attempt to set up their own government but
were forced out by African Americans.51  On April 13, 1873, a mob of
whites armed themselves and marched on the Colfax courthouse, then 
occupied by black Republicans.52  Outgunned, the African Americans 
surrendered to the white mob and turned over their weapons.53  Nevertheless, 
the white mob set the courthouse on fire and began slaughtering African
Americans.54 Hours after the attack had begun, approximately 100 African
Americans lay dead—burned alive in the courthouse, attacked outside its 
doors, and hunted down in the surrounding woods.55 
In response to the Colfax Massacre, nearly 100 of the white attackers 
were indicted for violating section six of the Enforcement Act.56  Of the
nearly 100 people indicted, only three were convicted.57  On appeal, the
 51. GOLDSTONE, supra note 27, at 88–89. 
52. Id. at 88. The number of white attackers varies by source. See id. (reporting
that more than 250 armed white men attacked approximately 150 African Americans). But 
see LANE, supra note 50, at 91 (stating that approximately 140 white men provoked the 
Colfax Massacre). 
53. GOLDSTONE, supra note 27, at 89.
 54. Id. But see id. (reporting that white attackers claimed their killings were instigated 
when an African American shot and killed their captain). 
55. Id. But see LANE, supra note 50, at 265 (estimating that between sixty-two and
eighty-one African Americans were killed in the Colfax Massacre). 
56. United States v. Cruikshank, 25 F. Cas. 707, 708 (C.C.D. La. 1874) (No. 
14,897) (citing Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 241 (2012))). The Enforcement Act was a bulwark for the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments.  It sought to ensure that Reconstruction laws were respected by
criminally sanctioning persons who conspired to interfere with another citizen’s federally
guaranteed rights. GOLDSTONE, supra note 27, at 91.  For further discussion on the purpose
of the Enforcement Act, see Xi Wang, The Making of Federal Enforcement Laws, 1870– 
1872, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1013, 1013, 1022–32 (1995).  Section six of the Enforcement 
Act stated “[t]hat if two or more persons shall band or conspire together, or go in disguise 
upon the public highway, or upon the premises of another, with intent to violate any
provision of this act, or to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen with intent to
prevent or hinder his free exercise and enjoyment of any right or privilege granted or
secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having 
exercised the same, such persons shall be held guilty of felony, and, on conviction thereof, 
shall be fined or imprisoned, or both, at the discretion of the court,—the fine not to exceed
five thousand dollars, and the imprisonment not to exceed ten years,—and shall, moreover, 
be thereafter ineligible to, and disabled from holding, any office or place of honor, profit, 
or trust created by the Constitution or laws of the United States.’”  United States v. 
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 548 (1875) (quoting Enforcement Act of 1870, § 6).  The defendants 
“were not charged with murder, [because] jurisdiction for that crime lay specifically with
the states.” GOLDSTONE, supra note 27, at 91. 
57. Cruikshank, 25 F. Cas. at 708. 
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Supreme Court reversed the defendants’ convictions, holding, in part, that 
the Fourteenth Amendment applied only to states, not to private actors.58 
The Court began by explaining that, in order for a defendant to be found 
guilty of violating the Enforcement Act, he must have banded together or 
conspired to violate a right “granted or secured by the constitution or laws 
of the United States.”59 However, this prohibition did not apply to
everyone.  Because the Enforcement Act was predicated on the Fourteenth
Amendment, it could not protect against a private citizen’s violation of 
one’s fundamental rights.60  It only protected against state interference.61 
The Court thus articulated the state action doctrine.62  Because the Fourteenth 
Amendment created no new rights between private individuals, states 
retained jurisdiction over actions between individuals.  Thus, the Enforcement
Act was inapplicable to the facts of this case.63 
Similarly, the Court dismissed other charges in the indictment on the 
basis that the charges failed to allege that the defendants had violated 
rights secured by the Constitution or federal laws.64  For example, the
justices ruled the Fifteenth Amendment was inapplicable because it protected 
against discrimination in exercising the right to vote.65  In contrast, 
affirmative voting rights are state-created.  Because the indictment did not 
specifically state that, the defendants had intended to interfere with voting 
58. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 554, 559; see also HOWARD, supra note 48, at 100 (“The 
record does not indicate that William Cruikshank or his companions were men of means[,] 
yet the defense team numbered in its ranks John A. Campbell, architect of the butchers’ 
Slaughterhouse argument and former member of the Supreme Court, and David Dudley
Field, brother of then sitting Justice Stephen Field. Money raised from Klan sympathizers . . .
probably also paid for the lawyers defending Cruikshank and his codefendants.”). 
59. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 549. 
60. Id. at 554. But see Wilson R. Huhn, The Legacy of Slaughterhouse, Bradwell, 
and Cruikshank in Constitutional Interpretation, 42 AKRON L. REV. 1051, 1074–78 (2009) 
(arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment was, in fact, intended to apply to acts of
discrimination committed by private individuals). 
61. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 554.  Specifically, the Court stated “[t]he fourteenth
amendment prohibits a State from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; but this adds nothing to the rights of one citizen as against 
another.  It simply furnishes an additional guaranty against any encroachment by the States 
upon the fundamental rights which belong to every citizen as a member of society.”  Id.
 62. The Evolution of the State Action Doctrine and the Current Debate, 123 HARV. 
L. REV. 1255, 1255 (2010); see id. at 1256–58, for a discussion of the state action
doctrine’s development. 
63. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 554. 
64. See, e.g., id. at 551–52 (stating that the right to assemble was not created by the 
First Amendment and that the First Amendment only protects against congressional 
interference on that right); id. at 553 (stating that the right to bear arms was not created by
the Second Amendment, which only protects citizens against federal encroachment). 
65. Id. at 555–56. 
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rights based on their race, the defendants had not violated a federal right
and, by extension, the Enforcement Act.66 
The Court reversed the convictions of the white defendants based on 
flaws in the indictment in alleging a violation of federal law.  Yet, the 
Court should have seen that the case implicated state action because the 
massacre was all about political power and, in addition, it could not have 
happened without the assistance of local authorities.  The KKK always 
acts with local authority working behind the scenes.  At the very least, the 
Court should have remanded the case to determine the extent to which
local authorities had participated in or sanctioned the massacre.  That 
would have brought the case within the state action doctrine.  Failing to 
do so, the Cruikshank Court failed on both a case-specific and a global 
level. That is, it failed to secure justice for African Americans who had 
been slaughtered in Colfax, and it opened the door to the Jim Crow Era. 
The state action doctrine itself is quite problematic.  It limits the Bill of 
Rights and Fourteenth Amendment, leaving the former slaves to the 
mercy of their former slaveholders and white supremacists.  Withdrawing 
federal protection made it open season on blacks in the southern states at
the hands of private citizens, who often acted under the closet authority of 
public officials.67  Similarly, the massacre was, at bottom, about political 
power and the exercise of the franchise by blacks.  It was about the integrity 
of the recently passed Fifteenth Amendment.  Had there not been a 
gubernatorial election in which blacks voted for the first time, there would 
not have been a massacre of blacks.  Federal rights were certainly implicated 
in Cruikshank, but the Court was too blind to see them.
3. United States v. Reese 
In United States v. Reese, the Supreme Court further undermined
African Americans’ rights by invalidating sections of the Enforcement
Act that criminalized unlawful interference with voting.68  In Reese, the
Supreme Court questioned whether two southern election officials could 
be punished under the Enforcement Act for refusing to allow William
 66. Id.
 67. See Lynching Statistics by Year, U. OF MO.-KAN. CITY, http://law2.umkc.edu/ 
faculty/projects/ftrials/shipp/lynchingyear.html [http://perma.cc/BK65-QERH] (last visited 
Nov. 5, 2015) (reporting the high volume of black lynchings that occurred, especially in 
the 1890s). 
68.  United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1875). 
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Garner, a qualified African American voter, to partake in a municipal
election in Kentucky.69  The election officials claimed they did not allow
Garner to vote because he had failed to pay the required $1.50 poll tax.70 
Garner countered that he had attempted to pay the poll tax, but his 
payment had been refused.71  The officials were indicted for violating the 
Enforcement Act, which provided federal punishment for interfering with
a citizen’s Fifteenth Amendment voting rights.72 
On review, the Supreme Court examined whether the election officials 
could be indicted under the third and fourth sections of the Enforcement
Act.73  Section three prohibited an election official from wrongfully
refusing to receive or count the vote of an eligible voter who presented an 
affidavit stating that a different state official had unreasonably failed to 
register that voter.74  Essentially, section three protected the voting rights
of eligible voters who had followed voting registration instructions but 
nonetheless had been wrongly turned away.  Section four promised punishment
to any person who used “force, bribery, threats, intimidation, or other
unlawful means . . . to hinder, delay, prevent, or obstruct, any citizen from 
doing any act required to be done to qualify him to vote[]or from voting.”75 
The Court began by noting that Congress’s power to create legislation 
governing state elections came from the Fifteenth Amendment.76  Next, it 
explained that the Fifteenth Amendment prohibited interfering with an 
eligible citizen’s voting rights based on race, color, or previous condition 
69. Reese, 92 U.S. at 215.  Kentucky was a slave state that remained loyal to the 
Union during the Civil War.  HOWARD, supra note 48, at 105.  About 60,000 Kentucky
residents served in the Union army, whereas 30,000 joined the Confederate army. Id.  
Despite its loyalty to the North, “pro-Union white sentiment [in Kentucky] was neither
opposed to slavery nor supportive of black rights.”  Id.
 70. Reese, 92 U.S. at 224–25 (Clifford J., dissenting). In response to the North’s 
Reconstruction efforts, many Southern states adopted poll taxes, which required eligible 
voters to pay a fee in order to vote.  See David Schultz & Sarah Clark, Wealth v. 
Democracy: The Unfulfilled Promise of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment, 29 QUINNIPIAC L. 
REV. 375, 388–89 (2011).  Poll taxes were used to prevent African Americans and poor
whites from voting. Id. at 386–91. 
71. Reese, 92 U.S. at 224–25 (Clifford, J., dissenting). 
72. Reese, 92 U.S. at 216–17 (quoting Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 
140 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 241 (2012))). 
73. Id. (quoting §§ 3–4, 16 Stat. at 140–41).  “The importance of Reese was 
reflected in the fact that more than forty cases were being held in abeyance pending the 
Court’s decision relative to William Garner’s claim” in Reese. HOWARD, supra note 48,
at 107. 
74. Reese, 92 U.S. at 216–17 (quoting § 3, 16 Stat. at 140–41). 
75. Id. at 217 (quoting § 4, 16 Stat. at 141). 
76. Id. at 218. 
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of servitude.77  If the Enforcement Act punished voting interference more 
broadly than the Fifteenth Amendment, the Court would find the act 
“unauthorized.”78  Finding that the third and fourth sections of the
Enforcement Act were broader in scope than the Fifteenth Amendment,
the Court declared those sections unconstitutional.79  These sections of the 
Enforcement Act criminalized any unlawful interference with voting 
rights, whereas the Fifteenth Amendment only criminalized interference 
with voting rights that had been motivated by race.80  Thus, the Court
found that Congress, through the Enforcement Act, had penalized acts 
outside of its jurisdiction, rendering the entirety of each section invalid.81 
Because the sections of the Enforcement Act prohibiting voting interference
were unconstitutional, the Court found there was no federal law under 
which the election officials could be charged. For that reason, it sustained 
the defendants’ demurrers.82 
With the stroke of the pen, the Reese Court wiped away federal voting 
protection for African Americans.  The Court could have construed sections
three and four in ways that brought them within the scope of the Fifteenth 
Amendment, such as by ruling that, as applied to the facts of Reese, these 
sections were limited to race.  Race clearly motivated the election officials 
to deny the right to vote in this case.  Moreover, when the Act is read in 
its entirety, there is little doubt that Congress intended to limit sections 
three and four to race-based voting violations.  As the dissent pointed out: 
[T]he intention of Congress on this subject is too plain to be discussed.  The 
Fifteenth Amendment had just been adopted, the object of which was to secure 
to a lately enslaved population protection against violations of their right to vote 
on account of their color or previous condition.  The act is entitled “An Act to
 77. Id. at 217–18. The Court noted that if the interference was not motivated by
race, color, or previous condition of servitude, Congress had no power to punish.  Id. at
218.
 78. Id.
 79. Id. at 220–21 (discussing §§ 3, 4, 16 Stat. 140–41); see also HOWARD, supra 
note 48, at 108 (explaining the Court’s rationale that the Fifteenth Amendment gave 
Congress power to legislate against racial discrimination, but sections three and four of
the Enforcement Act punished wrongful acts not necessarily motivated by racial animus, 
thus rendering the sections defective). 
80. Reese, 92 U.S. at 220. 
81. Id. at 221.  The Court also declined to enforce the parts of the Enforcement Act
it found legitimate in favor of striking down the whole act.  “To limit this statute in the 
manner now asked for would be to make a new law, not to enforce an old one.  This is no
part of our duty.”  Id.
 82. Id. at 221–22. 
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enforce the right of citizens of the United States to vote in the several states of the
Union, and for other purposes.”  The first section contains a general announcement 
that such right is not to be embarrassed by the fact of race, color, or previous 
condition.  The second section requires that equal opportunity shall be given to
the races in providing every prerequisite for voting, and that any officer who
violates this provision shall be subject to civil damages to the extent of $500, and
to fine and imprisonment.  To suppose that Congress, in making these provisions, 
intended to impose no duty upon, and subject to no penalty, the very officers who 
were to perfect the exercise of the right to vote,—to wit, the inspectors who 
receive or reject the votes,—would be quite absurd.83 
By invalidating sections three and four of the Enforcement Act in their 
entirety, the Court eliminated the only legislation reinforcing and supporting
the black Americans’ newfound voting rights.84  Again, the Court signaled 
it was open season for white supremacists to intimidate, threaten, and 
thwart racial advancement in this country. 
4. The Civil Rights Cases 
In the Civil Rights Cases, the Supreme Court declared that sections of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1875, securing equal treatment for African Americans 
in public accommodations, were unconstitutional.85  Five similar lawsuits
were consolidated in this case.86  Essentially, five African American 
plaintiffs had all filed separate lawsuits alleging that certain hotels, theaters, 
and public transit companies had violated the Civil Rights Act of 1875 by
denying them services or banning them from areas reserved for whites.87 
Section one of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 stated that: 
83. Id. at 241 (Hunt, J., dissenting) (discussing §§ 1–2, 16 Stat. 140). 
 84. “The impact of Cruikshank and Reese was immediate, practical, and devastating.
The 1876 presidential election was months away.”  HOWARD, supra note 48, at 109.  In 
1874, almost one thousand cases were filed in the South alleging violations of the
Enforcement Acts.  Id.  In 1875, after both Reese and Cruikshank were decided, that 
number fell to about two hundred suits.  Id. (citing ALLEN W. TRELEASE, WHITE TERROR 
385 n.2 (paperback ed. 1995)). 
85. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 4, 25 (1883) (citing the Civil Rights Act of 
1875, ch.114, 18 Stat. 335). 
86. Id. at 4–5; see also HOWARD, supra note 48, at 124–25 (“The cluster of suits 
that became the Civil Rights Cases illuminated the meaning of racial caste distinctions in 
the everyday lives of blacks and whites . . . .  It was a case [that] also went to the feeling
and tone of everyday life for blacks.”). 
87. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 4–5.  One of the five plaintiffs did not report 
his race.  That plaintiff brought suit against the Grand Opera House in New York “for 
denying to another person, whose color is not stated, the full enjoyment of the accommodations
of the theater[.]”  Id. at 4; see also HOWARD, supra note 48, at 126–27 (reporting that the 
plaintiff known as Mr. William R. Davis, a twenty-six-year-old African American man, 
had purchased tickets to the opera knowing he would not be admitted to test the opera
house’s discriminatory policy, much like Homer Plessy would later test Louisiana’s public 
transportation laws). 
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all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall be entitled to the full 
and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of
inns, public conveyances on land or water, theaters, and other places of public 
amusement; subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law, and
applicable alike to citizens of every race and color, regardless of any previous
condition of servitude.88 
Section two of the Act imposed a punishment on any person who 
violated section one.89  Under section two, a person who violated section 
one of the Civil Rights Act would have to pay $500 in damages to the 
person he had wronged, receive a misdemeanor conviction, and pay an 
additional fine or be given a minimum of thirty days of imprisonment.90 
The Court had to determine whether sections one and two were 
constitutional under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.91  First,
the Court held that sections one and two were not constitutional under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.92 As it had in Cruikshank,93 the Court stated that 
the Fourteenth Amendment only limited state action, not the actions of 
private citizens.94  Because the Civil Rights Act regulated individual 
citizens’ actions, the Court found the Act to be outside the scope of powers 
granted by the Fourteenth Amendment and thus unconstitutional.95 As to
the Thirteenth Amendment, the Court came to the same conclusion.96 
While “[C]ongress has a right to enact all necessary and proper laws for 
the obliteration and prevention of slavery, with all its badges and 
incidents,”97  refusing service to a person based on their skin color “ha[d] 
nothing to do with slavery or involuntary servitude” and was not akin to
a badge of slavery, the Court ruled.98  Thus, the ability to redress private 
citizens’ refusal of service to African Americans was outside Congress’s 
power and instead lay with the state.99  Because the Court found that the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments did not confer upon Congress the 
88. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 9 (quoting § 1, 18 Stat. at 336). 
89. Id. (quoting § 2, 18 Stat. at 336). 
90. Id. (quoting § 2, 18 Stat. at 336). 
91. Id.
 92. Id. at 19. 
93. See supra text accompanying notes 43–67. 
94. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 11. 
95. Id. at 19. 
96. Id. at 24–25. 
97. Id. at 21. 
98. Id. at 24. 
99. Id. 
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authority to create sections one and two of the Civil Rights Act of 1875,
the Court declared those sections void.100 
Justice Harlan filed a strong dissenting opinion in which he argued that
the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was not unconstitutional under the Thirteenth
and Fourteenth Amendments.101  He criticized the majority’s opinion as 
“narrow” and “artificial,” and, like Justices Clifford and Hunt dissenting 
in Reese,102 asserted that the majority had thwarted congressional intent, 
in this case the purpose behind the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.103 
Justice Harlan read the Thirteenth Amendment as prohibiting more than 
slavery.  “[T]he Thirteenth Amendment[ ]may be exerted by legislation . . . for
the eradication, not simply of the institution [of slavery], but of its badges 
and incidents[.]”104  Public transportation, hotels, and places of public
amusement were public or quasi-public functions, Justice Harlan continued, 
and “such discrimination [practiced by corporations and individuals in the 
exercise of their public or quasi-public functions] is a badge of servitude.”105 
The Thirteenth Amendment afforded Congress the power to combat that
badge of servitude through appropriate legislation, such as the Civil Rights 
Act of 1875.106 
Moving to the Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Harlan argued that this 
Amendment afforded Congress the power to limit the actions of states and 
private citizens.107  Justice Harlan argued that the Fourteenth Amendment 
affirmatively granted citizenship rights to African Americans, which
brought African Americans within the purview of the Constitution’s 
Privileges and Immunities Clause.108  Additionally, Justice Harlan explained
that Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment extended to Congress the 
affirmative right to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment through legislation.109 
Justice Harlan argued that the protection of civil rights from racial
discrimination was an essential feature of national and state citizenship, 
granted by the Fourteenth Amendment.110 Because the Constitution granted 
100. Id. at 25 (discussing the Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, §§ 1–2, 18 Stat. 335, 
335–36).
 101. Id. at 43, 58–59 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
102. See supra text accompanying note 83. 
103. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 26 (majority opinion). 
104. Id. at 35 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
105. Id. at 43 (discussing Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876)). 
106. Id.
 107. Id. at 46. 
108. Id. Section Two of Article Four of the United States Constitution is known as 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause.  It provides that “[t]he Citizens of each State shall 
be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.” U.S. CONST. 
art. 4, § 2.
 109. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 45–47. 
110. Id. at 49–50. 
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Congress the power to protect rights and privileges granted by the
Fourteenth Amendment to citizens, so too must Congress have the power
to affirmatively enact legislation applicable to all that protected African
Americans’ civil rights from racial discrimination.111  Without that power,
Congress would only be able to protect African Americans’ civil rights 
against states and not against individuals and corporations, which Justice 
Harlan argued runs contrary to Congress’s ability to “enforce one of its 
provisions.”112  Moreover, railroad corporations, innkeepers, and managers
of places of public amusement were public agents because they provided 
services to the public.113  Hence, “a denial by these instrumentalities of 
the state to the citizen, because of his race . . . is a denial by the state within
the meaning of the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment,” Justice Harlan insisted.114 
The Civil Rights Cases painfully limited the federal government’s ability
to protect African Americans from discrimination that impeded racial 
advancement.  Decrying the Court’s decision, the African American press 
called it “a farce.”115  Other news sources found the Court’s decision
unsurprising.116  Some even declared the decision “a triumph of law and 
sense,” misunderstanding the decision to mean “special rights for none[,]
but equal rights for all.”117 
It was Justice Harlan who intuitively summed up the truth in his dissent:
It is, I submit, scarcely just to say that the colored race has been the special
favorite of the laws . . . .  The one underlying purpose of congressional legislation
has been to enable the black race to take the rank of mere citizens.  The difficulty
has been to compel a recognition of their legal right to take that rank, and to secure 
the enjoyment of privileges belonging, under the law, to them as a component
part of the people for whose welfare and happiness government is ordained.118 
As bad as the decision in the Civil Right Cases was, Plessy v. Ferguson 
was worse.
 111. Id. at 52. 
112. Id.
 113. Id. at 58–59. 
114. Id. at 59. 
115. GOLDSTONE, supra note 27, at 129 (source quoted in Valeria W. Weaver, The 
Failure of Civil Rights 1875–1883 and Its Repercussions, 54 J. OF NEGRO HIST. 368, 371– 
72 (1969)). Following the Civil Rights Cases decision, over 2,000 whites and blacks
gathered in Washington D.C. at a protest where Frederick Douglass spoke.  HOWARD, 
supra note 48, at 131. 
116. See GOLDSTONE, supra note 27, at 128. 
117. Id. (quoting ATLANTA J. CONST., Oct. 16, 1883). 
118. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 61. 
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5. Plessy v. Ferguson 
In Plessy v. Ferguson, the Supreme Court notoriously upheld segregation 
in public transportation under the doctrine of “separate–but–equal.”119 
The plaintiff, Homer Plessy, was charged with violating Louisiana’s 
statute that prohibited whites and African Americans from riding in the 
same railway car after he boarded the white railway car and refused to 
switch to the “colored” car.120  To the naked eye, Plessy looked like a white
man.121  By blood, Plessy was seven-eighths white and one-eighth African 
American.122  After refusing to sit in the colored car, Plessy was removed 
by police, taken to local jail, and criminally charged.123  Plessy challenged 
Louisiana’s railcar statute, arguing that it violated the Thirteenth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.124 
In an 8–1 decision, the Supreme Court upheld Louisiana’s statute, finding 
that it violated neither the Thirteenth nor the Fourteenth Amendment.125 
In first finding no Thirteenth Amendment violation, the Court reasoned 
that the statute did not “reestablish a state of involuntary servitude” by 
simply making a legal separation between whites and blacks.126  Second,
the Court held that the statute did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.127 
The Court explained that the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was 
119. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550–51 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. 
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494–95 (1954); see also BROOKS ET AL., supra note 22, at 34–35 
(providing a synopsis of Plessy v. Ferguson).
 120. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 541.  Specifically, the statute stated “[T]hat all railway
companies carrying passengers in their coaches in this State, shall provide equal but 
separate accommodations for the white, and colored races, by providing two or more 
passenger coaches for each passenger train, or by dividing the passenger coaches by a 
partition so as to secure separate accommodations; provided that this section shall not be
construed to apply to street railroads.  No person or persons, shall be permitted to occupy
seats in coaches, other than, the ones, assigned, to them on account of the race they belong 
to.”  Separate Car Act, § 1, 1890 La. Acts 153, 153.  Violators would be charged $25 or 
imprisoned for up to twenty days.  § 2, 1890 La. Acts at 153. 
121. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 541.  Although he appeared white and likely could have 
ridden in the white railway car without issue, Plessy announced to the conductor that he
was one-eighth black—shades of Rosa Parks. See GOLDSTONE, supra note 27, at 159; 
ROSA PARKS WITH JIM HASKINS, ROSA PARKS: MY STORY 115–18 (1992) (recalling the 
famous civil rights instance in 1955 when Rosa Parks, an African American woman, was 
arrested after refusing to give her seat to a white bus rider). 
122. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 541.  Plessy’s actions were designed ahead of time to test 
the validity of southern segregation policies on public transportation.  GOLDSTONE, supra 
note 27, at 159.  The railway conductor and police deputy involved had agreed to take part 
in the incident, and Plessy was removed peacefully from the railway car.  Id.
 123. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 541–42. 
124. Id. at 542. 
125. Id. at 537, 542, 551–52, 558. 
126. Id. at 542–43. 
127. Id. at 550–51. 
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to treat races equally before the law, not to abolish racial distinctions or
create social equality.128  To support its pro-segregation stance, the Court
pointed to school segregation policies, “which ha[ve] been held to be a 
valid exercise of the legislative power even by courts of States where the 
political rights of the colored race have been longest and most earnestly 
enforced.”129  The Court dismissed Plessy’s argument that the statute was
unreasonable because it stamped nonwhites with “a badge of inferiority” 
by responding that nonwhites were responsible for their own feelings of
inferiority.130 
In a powerful dissent, Justice Harlan famously declared that the
Constitution is colorblind.131  The true purpose behind the Thirteenth, 
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, Justice Harlan believed, was to
“remov[e] the race line from our government[t]” and to secure equal civil 
rights for all Americans regardless of race.132  Louisiana’s statute interfered 
with African Americans’ right to travel about freely.133  Justice Harlan 
rejected the argument that the statute was not discriminatory because it
equally limited both whites and nonwhites in their railway seat options by
explaining the statute was meant to keep African Americans out of the 
white railway cars, not the other way around.134  He concluded that Louisiana’s
segregation law was invalid because it was facially inconsistent with the 
colorblind Constitution.135 A harbinger of modern thought, Harlan predicted 
the majority’s opinion would come to be seen as equally atrocious as Dred
Scott v. Sandford.136
 128. Id. at 544; see also HOWARD, supra note 48, at 148–49 (detailing how the 
majority opinion followed sociologist William Graham Sumner’s proposition that law-
ways cannot alter folkways, and thus the Fourteenth Amendment must not be construed as 
doing so). 
129. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544. 
130. Id. at 551. 
131. Id. at 559, 563 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Our Constitution is color[b]lind, and
neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.”). 
132. Id. at 555–56. 
133. Id. at 557. 
134. Id. at 556–57. 
135. Id. at 562. 
136. Id. at 559, 563; see, e.g., Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 
380 (2011) (referring to Plessy v. Ferguson and Dred Scott v. Sandford as stock answers 
to the question of what is the worst Supreme Court decision); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The
Worst Constitutional Decisions of All Time, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 995, 1001 (2003) 
(declaring that Plessy v. Ferguson and Dred Scott v. Sandford are “among the many
obvious rivals for the title of worst constitutional decision of all time”); see also HOWARD, 
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6. Williams v. Mississippi 
In Williams v. Mississippi, the Supreme Court upheld southern voting 
laws that blatantly operated to prevent African Americans from voting.137 
The plaintiff, Henry Williams, was indicted on a murder charged by an 
all-white grand jury in Mississippi.138 Williams moved to quash the
indictment alleging that Mississippi’s voter registration laws violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment.139 
Mississippi’s voter registration laws required eligible voters to pay a 
poll tax and pass a literacy test.140  The laws also gave election administration
officials complete discretion in administering the literacy test and determining 
whether an eligible voter had passed.141  Moreover, citizens of Mississippi 
were only eligible to serve on juries if they were registered voters.142 
Thus, the purpose of Mississippi’s voting requirements was two-fold. 
First, they meant to prevent African Americans from voting.  Second, they 
prevented African Americans from serving on juries.  The Mississippi circuit 
court denied Williams’s motion to quash.143 Williams’s subsequent motion 
to remove the case to federal court was also denied.144  An all-white jury
then convicted Williams and sentenced him to be hanged.145 
William appealed, arguing that Mississippi’s voter registration laws 
violated the Fourteenth Amendment because, despite their facial neutrality, 
the laws gave administrative officers absolute discretion to determine
voting eligibility, which in turn determined ability to sit on a jury.146 The 
Supreme Court recognized that Mississippi’s law afforded the election 
administrative officials enormous discretion: 
supra note 48, at 158 (“Laws mandating black zones and white zones were a logical
extrapolation of the premise of Plessy . . . .”). 
137. Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213, 225 (1898); see also CHARLES L. 
ZELDEN, THE BATTLE FOR THE BLACK BALLOT 18 (2004) (describing how many Southern
states enacted literacy tests, poll taxes, and grandfather clauses in the early 1900s in an 
effort to prevent blacks from voting). 
138. Williams, 170 U.S. at 213. 
139. Id. at 219. 
140. Id. at 220–21 (citing MISS. CONST. art XII, § 241 (repealed 1965), § 244
(repealed 1975)).  The voter registration law also included residency requirements and 
prohibited citizens who had been convicted of certain crimes from registering. Id. at 220– 
21 (citing MISS. CONST. art XII, §§ 241–42).  After Mississippi enacted its new voting
requirements, less than 9,000 of the 147,000 voting-age blacks voted in elections.  ZELDEN, 
supra note 137, at 18.
 141. Williams, 170 U.S. at 221 (discussing MISS. CONST. art XII, §§ 242, 244). 
142. Id. at 214. 
143. Id. at 217. 
144. Id.
 145. Id.
 146. Id. at 220. 
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[T]his officer can reject whomsoever he chooses, and register whomsoever he
chooses, for he is vested by the [Mississippi] constitution with that power . . . . 
The officer is the sole judge of the [literacy] examination of the applicant, and, 
even though the applicant be qualified, it is left with the officer to so determine; 
and the said officer can refuse him registration.147 
However, the Court determined there was insufficient evidence to prove 
that the voter registration laws had actually been administered in a
discriminatory fashion.148  To bolster this contention, the Court pointed
out that the plaintiff had brought suit against the law, not against any 
election officials.149  Ultimately, the Supreme Court upheld Mississippi’s
voter registration laws because they were facially neutral and evidence 
had shown only the likelihood—not certainty—that the laws had been
administered in a racially discriminatory manner.150 
The Williams decision effectively removed African Americans’ right to 
vote.  The decision supported election officials’ desire to prevent African
Americans from voting in contravention of the Fifteen Amendment.  It
impeded racial progress by placing a heavy evidentiary burden on African
Americans seeking to challenge the administration of state voting laws.
7. Giles v. Harris 
In Giles v. Harris, the Supreme Court declined to strike down 
Alabama’s voter registration laws, even though these laws were clearly
intended to prevent African Americans from voting.151  In  Giles, the
African American plaintiff brought suit against the Board of Registrars of
Montgomery, Alabama, on behalf of himself and 5000 other African
Americans.152  The plaintiff alleged that the Board of Registrars had unfairly
refused to register him and other eligible African Americans to vote before 
August 1, 1902,153 and that portions of Alabama’s state constitution dealing
 147. Id. at 221. 
148. Id. at 223; see also Angela Behrens et al., Ballot Manipulation and the “Menace 
of Negro Domination”: Racial Threat and Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States, 
1850-2002, 109 AM. J. SOC. 559, 569 (2003) (quoting Williams, 170 U.S. at 222)
(explaining how the Court was aware disenfranchisement laws were aimed to inhibit blacks 
from voting by targeting “‘the alleged characteristics of the negro race’ while allowing
laws to target both ‘weak and vicious white men as well as weak and vicious black men.’”). 
149. See Williams, 170 U.S. at 224–25. 
150. Id. at 225. 
151.  Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 486, 488 (1903). 
152. Id. at 482. 
153. Id. 
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with voter eligibility violated the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.154 
Alabama’s voting registration laws were split into two categories depending 
on whether a person had registered to vote before or after January 1, 1903.155 
For those who registered to vote before January 1, 1903, the eligibility
criteria were more relaxed, and voters received lifelong voting rights.156 
Alabama residents who registered to vote on or after January 1, 1903, faced 
stricter voting eligibility criteria, including literacy or wealth requirements.157 
The federal district court dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction.158 
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal on
different grounds.159  The Court found it “impossible to grant the equitable
relief which is asked,”160 because the plaintiff was asking that his name 
and the names of eligible African American voters be placed on the pre­
1903 voter registration list while asserting that Alabama’s voting registration 
scheme was unconstitutional.161  The Court refused to register the plaintiff 
under a potentially fraudulent voting registration scheme, while “express[ing]
no opinion as to the alleged fact of [the laws’] unconstitutionality[.]”162 
The Court noted that the plaintiff could not sue the state of Alabama and 
that a federal court could not issue an order requiring a state to act.163 
Thus, there was no relief a federal court could award the plaintiff.164 The
Court declared that if the state of Alabama had violated the plaintiff’s 
154. Id. (citing ALA. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 180–81, 183–88). 
155. Id. (citing ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 187). 
156. Id. at 482–83 (citing ALA. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 180, 187).  The pre-1903 voting 
registration criteria included residency requirements and poll taxes. ALA. CONST. art. VIII, 
§ 178.  It excluded from eligibility “insane persons” and people who had been convicted 
of certain crimes.  Id. at § 182.  Finally, it allowed men who were veterans, descendants 
of veterans, or “of good character and who understand the duties and obligations of 
citizenship under a republican form of government” to register to vote.  Id. at §§ 182, 187. 
Unsurprisingly, the pre-1903 voter registration laws were “practically administered . . . 
[to] let in all whites and [keep] out a large part, if not all, of the blacks,” so African
Americans would not be assured lifelong voting rights.  Giles, 189 U.S. at 483. 
157. Giles, 189 U.S. at 483–84 (citing ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 181). Under the post­
1903 scheme, a person seeking to register to vote either had to pass a literacy test, own 40
acres of land, or have substantial real and personal property upon which they had paid 
$300 in state taxes the previous year.  Id. (citing ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 181). 
158. Id. at 485 (dismissing the case because the plaintiff’s suit had not alleged that 
the amount–in–controversy was $2,000 or more). 
159. Id. at 488. 
160. Id. at 486. 
161. Id. at 486–87. 
162. Id.; see also HOWARD, supra note 48, at 164 (explaining how the Court’s 
opinion “gratuitously ridicule[d] the plaintiffs and their claims. . . .  If the law was a fraud
how could they ask to be its beneficiary, but if it were not a fraud, as implied by a demand 
to be put on the rolls it created, why would they complain about being excluded by
its operation.”).
 163. Giles, 189 U.S. at 487–88 (citing Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890)). 
164. Id. at 488. 
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political rights, only that state, Congress, or the Executive Branch could
grant relief.165 But the Court does have the power of moral leadership, as
it exhibited in Brown v. Board of Education. In affirming the district 
court’s dismissal, the Giles Court held that it was unable to grant the 
plaintiff relief by putting his name on the pre-1903 voter registration list 
or declaring Alabama’s entire voting scheme fraudulent and ordering a 
new, valid system.166  The Court, once again, did all that it could to impede
racial advancement—what an inglorious racial history. 
B. Moving Toward Redemption 
Responding to pressure exerted by a relentless litigation campaign 
waged by the NAACP, the Supreme Court began to chip away at the 
regime of second-class citizenship it had helped erect since the Court’s 
inception. There were many NAACP victories, each laying the foundation 
for the Brown decision. Three are especially important: Missouri ex rel.
Gaines v. Canada,167 McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher 
Education,168 and Sweatt v. Painter.169 
1. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada 
In Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, petitioner Lloyd Gaines, an
African American, was refused admission to the state’s all-white law 
school at the University of Missouri.170  There were no Missouri law
schools for blacks.171  Respondent admitted at trial that petitioner’s “work 
and credits at the Lincoln University [his undergraduate school] would 
qualify him for admission to the School of Law of the University of 
Missouri if he were found otherwise eligible.”172  Petitioner was refused 
admission upon the ground that it was “contrary to the constitution, laws[,] 
and public policy of the State to admit a negro as a student in the University 
of Missouri.”173  Respondent advised petitioner to apply for aid under a 
165. Id.
 166. Id. at 486–88. 
167.  305 U.S. 337 (1938). 
168.  339 U.S. 637 (1950). 
169.  339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
170.  305 U.S. at 342. 
171. Id. at 345. 
172. Id. at 343. 
173. Id. 
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state statute that allowed the State Superintendent of Schools to arrange
for the admittance of blacks to law schools in other states, including adjacent 
states, where non-resident blacks are admitted.174  The statute also allowed 
the Superintendent to pay the tuition of these law schools.175 
Siding with the petitioner, the Supreme Court held that the state violated 
constitutional equal protection when it failed to provide an in-state law 
school for blacks.176  The Court pushed aside respondent’s arguments that
there is “a legislative declaration of a purpose to establish a law school for 
negroes at Lincoln University whenever necessary or practical”; and that, 
“pending the establishment of such a school, adequate provision has been 
made for the legal education of negro students in recognized schools 
outside of this State.”177  The Court rejected the promise of a black law
school as nothing more than words—“a mere declaration of purpose, still 
unfulfilled”178—certainly not a “mandatory duty.”179  Similarly, the Court 
found the state’s “generous” offer to arrange for and pay the tuition of
petitioner to attend an out–of–state law school to be constitutionally 
insufficient: 
Manifestly, the obligation of the State to give the protection of equal laws can be
performed only where its laws operate, that is, within its own jurisdiction.  It is
there that the equality of legal right must be maintained.  That obligation is imposed 
by the Constitution upon the States severally as governmental entities, —each
responsible for its own laws establishing the rights and duties of persons within
its borders.  It is an obligation the burden of which cannot be cast by one State upon 
another, and no State can be excused from performance by what another State 
may do or fail to do.180 
Under this rationale, there would be a constitutional violation if Missouri
“arrange[d] for the attendance” and paid the “reasonable tuition fees”181 
of blacks to attend Harvard Law School. 
The fact that the petitioner was the first African American to demand a 
law school at Lincoln University was no excuse for not providing one
beforehand. As the Court ruled, the constitutional right at issue was a 
“personal” one.182  The petitioner was therefore entitled to equal protection 
of the laws as an individual, regardless of whether other members of his 
174. Id. at 342–43 (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 9622 (1929)). 
175. Id. (quoting § 9622). 
176. Id. at 345. 
177. Id. at 346 (quoting State ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 113 S.W.2d 783, 791 (1937), 
rev’d, 305 U.S. 337 (1938)). 
178. Id.
 179. Id.
 180. Id. at 350. 
181. Id. at 342–43 (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 9622 (1929)). 
182. Id. at 351. 
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class sought the same opportunity.183  Of course, a personal right in
the discrimination context is only comprehensible by reference to 
characteristics that form the basis for the animus, which, in turn, are 
common to other members who might suffer the same discrimination. 
Group rights and personal rights are not mutually exclusive in civil rights
cases. Perhaps the Court invoked the idea of “personal rights” because it
thought that admitting Mr. Gaines to the law school as a matter of personal 
right might seem less threatening to the status quo than declaring the rights 
of African Americans as a group. 
Indeed, although Gaines was a major victory for all African Americans, 
because it was the first Supreme Court case that expressly held that 
separate education must actually be equal, the case still very much maintained 
the status quo. It did not require desegregation or integration.  Blacks 
remained separate but equal, which is to say they continued to be regarded
as second-class citizens under the Court’s civil rights jurisprudence.  The 
Court, in short, was not prepared to overrule Plessy.184 
Yet, the Court’s attitude toward black advancement was clearly changing, 
and Gaines was an unmistakable manifestation of that change not only in
the Court’s holding and reasoning on the substantive issues, but also on
the procedural issues.  Whereas in earlier cases the Court’s anti-black rulings
had turned on minor procedural errors by the petitioners,185 the Court was
quite willing to push aside arguably more serious pleading errors, such as 
the failure to exhaust all remedies in Gaines. The Court seemed to ignore
or play down pleading problems in support of racial equality.186
 183. Id. at 350–51. 
184.  For further discussion, see Sherman P. Willis, Bridging the Gap: A Look at the 
Higher Public Education Cases Between Plessy and Brown, 30 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 1, 
5–12 (2004). 
185. See Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78, 84 (1927) (finding a failure to allege Chinese
petitioner was denied the right to attend a “colored school”); Cumming v. Richmond Cty. 
Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528, 545 (1899) (petitioner did not allege that school district failed 
to establish and maintain a high school for “colored children” out of existing funds). 
186. All things being equal, if the Court ignored pleading problems when it wanted
to and used them when it so desired, it could be argued that the Court denied equal 
protection of the laws in violation of the Fifth Amendment.  Because all things are not 
equal, there is no clash between subordination discourse and discrimination discourse. 
Also, because the Court is the final arbiter of what the law is, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 
(1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803), a Fifth Amendment challenge under discrimination law would 
be unavailing. 
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2. McLaurin and Sweatt 
In two cases handed down on the same day in 1950, the Supreme Court 
continued to move toward rectifying its shameful past.  The first case was 
McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education.187  As a  
condition for enrolling in a graduate program at an all-white university
under the Gaines precedent, appellant G.W. McLaurin, an African American
Ph.D. candidate, had to comply with a state statute that required the
following:
[him] to sit apart at a designated desk in an anteroom adjoining the classroom; to
sit at a designated desk on the mezzanine floor of the library, but not to use the 
desks in the regular reading room; and to sit at a designated table and to eat at a 
different time from the other students in the school cafeteria.188 
Not unlike it did in Gaines, the Court pushed by the state’s main 
argument, that the conditions it imposed were “merely nominal,”189 to rule
in favor of black advancement on equal protection grounds.  The 
educational conditions imposed on the appellant were so humiliating and 
segregating that he was “handicapped in his pursuit of effective graduate 
instruction. Such restrictions impair and inhibit his ability to study, to
engage in discussions and exchange views with other students, and, in 
general, to learn his profession.”190  The Court not only found that the
appellant had an equality interest in integrated education, which interest,
as the interest in Gaines, was “personal and present”191—not dependent
upon similar requests made by other blacks and ripened with the 
establishment of similar educational opportunities for whites192—but, for
the very first time, linked the black equality interest to good social policy: 
Our society grows increasingly complex, and our need for trained leaders
increases correspondingly.  Appellant’s case represents, perhaps, the epitome of
that need, for he is attempting to obtain an advanced degree in education, to become, 
by definition, a leader and trainer of others.  Those who will come under his guidance 
and influence must be directly affected by the education he receives.  Their own
education and development will necessarily suffer to the extent that his training 
187.  339 U.S. 637 (1950). 
188. Id. at 640. 
189. Id.
 190. Id. at 641. 
191. Id. at 642. 
192. “It is fundamental that these cases concern rights [that] are personal and present. 
This Court has stated unanimously that ‘The State must provide [legal education] for 
[petitioner] in conformity with the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
and provide it as soon as it does for applicants of any other group.’”  Sweatt v. Painter, 
339 U.S. 629, 635 (1950) (quoting Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents, 332 U.S. 631, 633 (1948)). 
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is unequal to that of his classmates.  State-imposed restrictions [that] produce such 
inequalities cannot be sustained.193 
In the next case, Sweatt v. Painter,194 the Court continued the process of 
historical reversal. However, unlike McLaurin, the Court did not place 
the black equality interest in the larger context of good social policy.  Instead, 
the Court packaged the asserted interest as only a “personal and present” 
constitutional right.195 
The Court in Sweatt came very close to overturning Plessy v. Ferguson.196 
The issue was whether a new law school built for African Americans in 
Texas offered the petitioner, Heman Marion Sweat, “‘privileges, advantages, 
and opportunities for the study of law substantially equivalent to those 
offered by the State to white students at the University of Texas,’” from 
which Sweatt had been denied admission because of the color of his 
skin197  The Court answered this question in the affirmative.198  It held that
the petitioner must be admitted to Texas Law School because the state’s 
black law school was unequal in physical facilities and “reputation of the 
faculty, experience of the administration, position and influence of the 
alumni, standing in the community, traditions and prestige.  It is difficult 
to believe that one who had a free choice between these law schools would 
consider the question close.”199  While reiterating that the equality interest
petitioner sought to assert—an integrated or quality education (same
difference in this case)—was “personal and present,”200 the Court did not
link the vindication of this interest to good social policy.  The Court kept
the interest “personal.” 
McLaurin and Sweatt have important differences that make the former 
the more important case.  McLaurin links black advancement to good 
social policy; Sweatt does not. The black interest asserted in Sweatt has 
no significance beyond the individual who asserts it.  Neither case, however, 
changed the legal status of blacks, who remained second-class citizens.
 193. McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 641. 
194.  339 U.S. 629, 635–36 (1950). 
195. See id. at 635. 
196. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494– 
95 (1954). 
197. Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 632 (quoting Sweatt v. Painter, 210 S.W.2d 442, 446 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1948), rev’d, 339 U.S. 629 (1950)). 
198. Id. at 632–33. 
199. Id. at 634. 
200. Id. at 635. 
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Separate–but–equal was still the law of the land. In fact, Sweatt explicitly 
refused to “reach petitioner’s contention that Plessy v. Ferguson should 
be reexamined in the light of contemporary knowledge respecting the 
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment and the effects of racial 
segregation.”201  That task was left to Brown. 
C. Juridical Redemption: Brown v. Board of Education 
1. The Opinion 
With the momentum of cases that chipped away at the separate–but– 
equal doctrine, Gaines, McLaurin, and Sweatt in particular, a unanimous 
Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education raised and answered the 
dispositive issue: “Does segregation of children in public schools solely
on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other ‘tangible’ 
factors may be equal, deprive the children of the minority group of equal 
educational opportunities? We believe that it does.”202 
The Court then went on to sign the execution warrant for Jim Crow.  It
ruled, “in the field of public education the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ 
has no place. . . .  [S]uch segregation is a denial of the equal protection of 
201. Id. at 636. 
202. 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).  The attack on separate–but–equal was first lodged 
at the district court level in one of the four cases consolidated in Brown, Briggs v. Elliott, 
342 U.S. 350 (1952), when the NAACP, with some prodding from a sympathetic trial 
judge, Judge Julius Waties Waring, changed its litigation strategy against separate–but– 
equal from an attack on the equality part of the equation—equalized facilities—to an attack 
on the separation part— segregation is immoral and inherently unequal. See Brown, 347
U.S. at 486 n.1; RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 304 (2004).  There is a bit of
a controversy regarding how the NAACP’s litigation strategy changed.  In his memoir, A 
MATTER OF LAW: A MEMOIR OF STRUGGLE IN THE CAUSE OF EQUAL RIGHTS, Robert L. 
Carter claims that the original complaint in Briggs stated a frontal attack on the separate– 
but–equal doctrine and that the group’s litigation strategy had changed from tangible to 
intangible inequality.  CARTER, supra note 5, at 96.  Based on our review of the original 
filing papers, we must side with Richard Kluger’s account.  The complaint in Briggs 
focuses on tangible inequality, such as “failing to or refusing to provide such bus 
transportation to Negro children” and “maintaining public schools for Negro children . . . 
which are in every respect inferior to [as opposed to separate from] those maintained for
white children.”  Complaint at 9–10, Briggs v. Bd. of Trs. for Sch. Dist. No. 22, (E.D.S.C. 
May 17, 1950) (No. 2505).  Although the amended complaint continues to make reference 
to the “facilities,” it also avers that “the policy, custom, practice and usage of defendants . . . in
refusing to allow infant plaintiffs, and other Negro children, to attend elementary and 
secondary public schools in Clarendon County, South Carolina which are maintained and 
operated exclusively for white children is a violation of the equal protection of the laws as 
guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution[.]”  Complaint at 12, 
Briggs v. Elliott, 98 F. Supp. 529 (E.D.S.C. Dec. 22, 1950) (No. 2657). 
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the laws.”203 Brown changed the sociopolitical environment for racial 
relations in our country.  From that point forward, the law would regard
blacks as people whose lives mattered.  Equal opportunity before the 
law—formal equal opportunity—was now the law of the land, first in the 
field of education, then spreading to other segments of society. 
Looking back at the decision a decade later, Judge Robert Carter, one 
of the NAACP lawyers who argued the case before the Supreme Court, 
wrote that Brown’s decision engendered “a social upheaval the extent and 
consequences of which cannot even now be measured with certainty” and 
changed the legal status of black Americans from mere supplicants “seeking,
pleading, begging to be treated as full-fledged members of the human
race” to persons entitled to equal treatment under the law.204  Effectively 
ending racial segregation, a relic of slavery, the decision was, in the view 
of Judge Louis Pollak, who had for most of his professional life been an 
advisor to the NAACP lawyers, “probably the most important American
government act of any kind since the Emancipation Proclamation.”205 
Hence, Judge Pollak saw the decision in the same light as did Judge Carter. 
In a 2004 interview on NPR, he observed that, “even though it was a decision 
about schools, [Brown] became a precedent for, in the next half-dozen 
years, a series of Supreme Court decisions where they didn’t even have to
write opinions, where they knocked out segregation in buses, in parks, in 
swimming pools and the whole array of public institutions that had been
blanketed with Jim Crow for half a century.”206 
2. The Motivation 
Many contemporary legal scholars view Brown in materialistic terms.
They argue that the Supreme Court’s decision to upset settled law was 
motivated less by a racial awakening or fulfillment of the American Creed—
 203. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495. 
204. Robert L. Carter, The Warren Court and Desegregation, 67 MICH. L.  REV. 237, 
246–47 (1968). 
205. About the Book, RICHARDKLUGER.COM, http://www.richardkluger.com/About 
SimpleJustice.htm [http://perma.cc/MSU5-V4YF] (last visited Nov. 5, 2015).  Judge Pollak 
had served as the dean of Yale Law School and the University of Pennsylvania Law School
prior to becoming a judge.  Dennis Hevesi, Louis H. Pollak, Civil Rights Advocate and 
Federal Judge, Dies at 89, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/13/us/ 
louis-pollak-judge-and-civil-rights-advocate-dies-at-89.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/MFP9- 
97D8].
 206. Hevesi, supra note 205. 
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the Court’s response to the American Dilemma made plain by Gunnar 
Myrdal207—than by material considerations.208  Not only had we just
fought a war to save democracy for the world, but also black soldiers returned 
home with a new militancy.  They were unwilling to accept second-class 
citizenship.209 
There were also geopolitical considerations.  At the time of Brown, the 
United States was in the throes of the Cold War, in which a major 
objective was to win the hearts and minds of the black, brown, and yellow 
people of the Third World.  Foreign press reports, letters from United States 
ambassadors abroad, and other communiqués clearly and persistently indicated
that the United States could not win the Cold War if world news 
organizations continued to carry stories of lynchings, murders of young 
blacks like that of 14-year-old Emmett Till, racial discrimination against
African delegates to the United Nations in places of public accommodation,
and other domestic incidents of racial oppression.210 So serious were these 
concerns that the United States Department of State filed amicus curiae 
brief in Brown that sided with the NAACP.211  This was the first time in 
American history that the government sided with the NAACP in a 
207. Gunnar Myrdal was a Swedish Nobel laureate economist and sociologist who
headed a large scale study of racial relations in the United States funded by the Carnegie 
Institution and documented in his seminal book, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO
PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY (1944). That book described the problem of race in 
the United States as “an America Dilemma” because of the obvious conflict between the high 
ideals of freedom and equality embedded in our founding documents and continuously
espoused by our leaders, which Myrdal called the “American Creed,” and the regime of
cruelty and humiliation visited upon blacks under the separate–but–equal doctrine, or Jim 
Crow. Id. at xlvii. The materialists play down the impact Myrdal’s book had on the Brown 
Court. 
208. For a more detailed discussion of this perspective, see sources cited infra, n.210; 
DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE UNFULFILLED
HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM 59–68 (2004) (explaining how the Court in Brown reacted to
geopolitical concerns). 
209. For a discussion, see, for example, ROY L. BROOKS, RETHINKING THE AMERICAN 
RACE PROBLEM 28 (1992) (describing the role of the war in encouraging the issuance of 
presidential executive orders). 
210. See, e.g., MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE 
OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 48–79 (2002) (discussing international impressions of American
racism); Richard Delgado, Explaining the Rise and Fall of African American Fortunes— 
Interest Convergence and Civil Rights Gains, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV 369, 369–76
(2002) (book review) (describing the American response to international censure of 
various racist acts in the United States). Emmett Till’s murder for allegedly whistling at
a white woman was so monstrous that it helped inspire Rosa Park’s civil rights defiance. 
Allan Jalon, 1955 Killing Sparked Civil Rights Revolution: Emmett Till: South’s Legend 
and Legacy, L.A. TIMES, (Oct. 7, 1985), http://articles.latimes.com/1985-10-07/news/mn­
16511_1_emmett-till-s-name [http://perma.cc/274J-4XTX].  
211. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 
483 (1954) (Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5), 1952 WL 82045. 
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segregation case.  The government’s amicus curiae brief referred to Secretary
of State Dean Acheson’s report stating that “racial discrimination in the 
United States remains a source of constant embarrassment to this Government
in the day[–]to[–]day conduct of its foreign relations; and it jeopardizes 
the effective maintenance of our moral leadership of the free and democratic 
nations of the world.”212  American racism made it difficult for the United
States to market democracy as a protector of personal freedoms.
We see another motivation for the Court’s decision in Brown; namely, 
the Supreme Court’s own history in racial relations—its inglorious racial 
past.213  When viewed within that context, Brown stands for something 
quite different, and what it stands for is not inconsistent with the materialist 
take on the case.214 
Well aware of its sordid precedents, the Brown Court arguably sought
to end the harm that prior Supreme Courts had visited upon generations 
of blacks.  At its most basic level, Brown should be understood as a case 
of juridical redemption, a case in which the Court seeks to atone for its 
inglorious racial history enshrined in cases like Dred Scott and Plessy. 
Brown sought to reverse course, to support racial advancement rather than
to continue to impede it.  And it sought to do so less because it felt sorry 
for blacks or wanted to accord them special treatment than because it saw 
racial advancement as good social policy.
Ending school segregation in 1954 was good social policy.  The Brown 
Court, in fact, explicitly noted “the importance of education to our democratic
society.”215  School segregation was fundamentally inconsistent with
 212. Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education: Forty-Five Years After the Fact, 26
OHIO N. U. L. REV. 171, 179–80 (2000) (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus 
Curiae, supra note 211, at 8); see DUDZIAK, supra note 210; Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation
as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV. 61, 111–12 (1988). 
213. See supra Part 1.A. 
214. Nor is the materialistic view inconsistent with the Mydralian view.  Clearly, the 
justices could have been motivated by both materialistic (bringing the country into a new, 
post-War order) and idealistic (living up to the American Creed) considerations, the latter 
of which could include atonement for a shameful judicial course of conduct in racial 
relations.  For other views regarding the meaning of Brown, see, for example, MARTHA
MINOW, IN BROWN’S WAKE: LEGACIES OF AMERICA’S EDUCATIONAL LANDMARK (2010) 
(describing the challenges of post-Brown integration and treating various interpretations 
of Brown); WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION’S TOP 
LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA’S LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS DECISION (Jack M. Balkin, 
ed., paperback ed., 2002) (collecting a group of constitutional law scholars’ rewritten Brown 
opinions). 
215.  Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
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democracy’s internal morality—human dignity.  To reach that conclusion, 
the Court had to reject Plessy’s “finding” that the segregation statutes did 
not stamp blacks with a “badge of inferiority” and that any suggestion of 
black inferiority arising from racial segregation came from a twisted black 
perspective.216 Heeding the voices of black children spoken through the
doll test, the work of black psychologists Kenneth and Mamie Clark,217 
Brown went in the opposite direction of Plessy, finding that “‘[s]egregation 
of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect 
upon the colored children.’ . . .  Any language in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary
to this finding is rejected.”218  Brown thus embraced racial advancement 
as a matter of good social policy. 
II. ELEMENTS OF JURIDICAL SUBORDINATION 
The phase “juridical subordination” is used to describe judicial
decision-making in civil rights cases, especially at the Supreme Court 
level, that inhibits racial advancement by suppressing the black equality
interest.219  Such decision-making is bad social policy, we argue, because
it reverses the civil rights course set in Brown and undercuts Brown’s
noble attempt to reverse the Supreme Court’s inglorious racial history. 
Juridical subordination, then, occurs when the Supreme Court, without 
racist intent, suppresses the black equality interest necessary for racial
advancement.  The Court itself becomes an object of civil rights scrutiny. 
Unearthing juridical subordination is a complex process that necessarily
begins with an understanding of the black equality interest in civil rights 
law.220  In overturning the separate–but–equal doctrine, the Brown Court
embraced a rather ambiguous concept of racial equality, or black equality, 
that scholars call “formal equal opportunity.”221  FEO, as it is sometimes 
called, guarantees equal rights under the law. In the decades following 
Brown, Congress and the Supreme Court have fashioned two potentially 
conflicting tenets to give meaning to formal equal opportunity: “racial 
216. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of 
Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494–95 (1954). 
217. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 n.11 (citing studies including Kenneth Bancroft Clark, 
Effect of Prejudice and Discrimination on Personality Development (Midcentury White
House Conference on Children and Youth, 1950)). 
218. Id. at 494–95 (quoting finding VIII of the district court in Brown, filed with the
opinion but not printed in 98 F. Supp. 797 (D. Kan. 1951)). 
219. See generally, Roy L. Brooks, Racial Inequality Beyond Racial Discrimination
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (describing the ancillary problem not solved
by Brown: the post-civil rights race problem). 
220. See infra Part II.B.1. 
221. See, e.g., BROOKS, supra note 209, at 29 (discussing Brown’s role as the first 
governmental act to make formal equal opportunity a constitutional imperative). 
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omission”—or color blind—and “racial integration”—or racial mixing.222 
These operating tenets effectively defined the black equality interest during 
the civil rights period and guided both the creation and application of civil 
rights law during the time as well as today. 
Governing both the civil rights and post-civil rights periods, our civil 
rights law can be divided into antidiscrimination law and racial preference 
law. Antidiscrimination law mainly implements the racial omission tenet 
of formal equal opportunity through the intent or effects test, while racial 
preference law primarily enforces the racial integration tenet through 
application of the strict scrutiny test.223  The primary sources of civil rights
law, whether antidiscrimination law or racial preference law, are the 
Constitution, most particularly the Equal Protection Clause, and myriad
federal statutes proscribing discrimination.224 
As we shall see, the black equality interests and implementing law 
crafted during the civil rights era are not the only ways to promote racial 
advancement in today’s post-civil rights society.  Indeed, they may not be 
the best or even sound approaches in today’s society. One of the questions 
staring us in the face is whether the civil rights-era equality interests—racial 
omission and racial integration—continue to have currency in post-civil
rights America.  Are they themselves elements of juridical subordination?225 
To answer that question, we begin with a discussion of the black equality
interests and implementing law in the civil rights era. 
A. Civil Rights Period 
1. Black Equality Interest
Racial omission and racial integration are operating tenets for formal 
equal opportunity, the civil rights policy that replaced separate–but–equal. 
Taken together, they define “equal rights” or, for present purposes, the 
black equality interest under a regime of equal rights.  Racial omission
defines equal rights, or the black equality interest, as racial neutrality.  The 
government’s stance on matters of race should be neutral, or color blind. 
Race must be omitted from governmental rules and policies regarding 
222. Id. at 29–30. 
223.  See discussion infra Parts II.A.2, II.B.3. 
224.  See discussion infra Parts II.A.2, II.B.3. 
225. 
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education, employment, housing, and other areas of American life.226 
Racial groups are entitled to equal treatment, or racial neutrality, from the 
government in all aspects of life.  White Americans should not be given 
any government-sanctioned freedoms or privileges not also available to 
African Americans and vice versa.227 
Racial integration is racial omission’s sibling tenet.  It defines formal
equal opportunity, or the black equality interest thereunder, as racial mixing.228 
All aspects of the government and government-supported segments of
American society—whether educational, economic, or social—should be 
racially mixed.  Racially integrated settings create opportunities for blacks 
and, at the same time, remove from the public arena all vestiges of prior 
systems of racial oppression.  However, beneficial racial integration might 
be for blacks and the nation as a whole, the racial integration tenet, unlike 
the racial omission tenet, is permissive rather than mandatory, at least in
the Supreme Court’s deployment of the tenet.  Governmental entities need
not take affirmative steps to promote racial mixing, and, in fact, can only 
do so under very limited circumstances.229  They, however, must take
affirmative measures to ensure that their policies and practices are race­
neutral.230 
Clearly, the racial omission and racial integration tenets presuppose 
racial desegregation. No government could logically or successfully operate 
a public policy that mandates the omission of race from legal considerations
or calls for racial mixing without first, or at least simultaneously, removing 
legal designations that exclude and stigmatize a racial group. The failure 
to do so would be disingenuous and certainly would create governmental 
dysfunction, if not cognitive dissonance among Americans, on racial matters. 
The racial integration and racial omission tenets sometimes collide with 
each other. This happens most famously in the case of affirmative action, 
which typically promotes racial integration in a race-conscious manner.231
 226. See BROOKS, supra note 209, at 29. 
227. Id.
 228. Id. at 30. 
229. See, e.g., BROOKS ET AL., supra note 22, at 1323–1401 (discussing that voluntary
affirmative action must have a remedial or educational diversity purpose). 
230. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012) (prohibiting employment discrimination
on the basis of race). 
231. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (remanding 
Caucasian student’s suit against a university for discrimination against her on the basis of
race because the Fifth Circuit did not apply strict scrutiny to her claims); Parents Involved 
in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (school districts’ use of 
racial classifications as a “tiebreaker” to promote diversity was unconstitutional because 
districts failed to meet high bar for justifying racial discrimination); Gratz v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 244 (2003) (selection method favoring “underrepresented” groups violated Equal 
Protection clause); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (narrowly tailored admissions
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Yet, the tenets need not collide.  Colorblind decision-making can support 
the racial integration tenet on the theory that it allows racial mixing to 
unfold naturally—by the removal of the artificial barrier of racial segregation 
rather than by affirmative measures taken by an institution.  When the tenets
collide, one of them must yield.  Usually civil rights law requires the racial
integration tenet to give ground.232 
2. Implementing Law
There are two basic mechanisms in American law for the enforcement
of formal equal opportunity, or the racial omission and racial integration 
tenets.  The first is through antidiscrimination law, and the second is through 
racial preference, or affirmative action, law.  Both sets of law comprise 
modern civil rights law.  Each is provided for in federal statutes as well as 
the U.S. Constitution. 
On the statutory side, there are myriad federal statutes that both 
proscribe racial discrimination and permit racial preferences.  The Civil
Rights Act of 1964,233 the Voting Rights Act of 1965,234 the Fair Housing 
Act of 1968,235 and the 1972 amendments to Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act236 are the most significant federal antidiscrimination and racial 
preference laws implementing the racial omission and racial integration 
program, although race-conscious, served a compelling interest and was therefore 
constitutional); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (applying strict
scrutiny to racial classifications in awarding government contracts); City of Richmond v. 
J.A. Croson, Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (holding city failed to show a compelling government 
interest justifying plan requiring contractors to award subcontracts to minorities); Regents 
of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (allowing measured use of race as an
admissions criterion). See generally BROOKS, ET AL., supra note 22, at 1323–1401 (discussing
the remedial purpose and diversity rationales, the discriminatory purpose requirement, and 
alternatives to affirmative action); KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 501–86 (17th ed. 2010) (discussing Supreme Court jurisprudence 
on equal protection in the racial discrimination context). 
232. See BROOKS ET AL., supra note 22, at 1323–1401; SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra 
note 231. 
233. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 42 U.S.C.). 
234. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 52 U.S.C.). 
235. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (1968) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
3601–3619). 
236. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103
(amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (Supp. V. 1975)). 
 861 


















   




tenets. Vindicating the racial omission tenet, the 1964 Civil Rights Act 
has eleven titles, each of which prohibits discrimination “on the basis of
race or color” in a major sector of American life, such as voting,237 public
accommodations,238 public education,239 and employment240—to mention 
just a few. Similarly, the 1965 Voting Rights Act, which vastly improves 
the voting protections provided in Title I of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 
which mainly established standards applicable to voter registration,241 
bans all forms of discrimination in voting from literacy tests to complex
schemes of vote dilution “on account of race or color.”242  The 1968 Fair 
237. Tit. 1, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 101, 78 Stat. 241, 241–42 (codified as amended at 
52 U.S.C. § 10101 (2012)). 
238. Id., tit. 2, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 201–07, 78 Stat. at 243–46 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000a to a-6 (2012)). 
239. Id., tit. 4, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 401–10, 78 Stat. at 246–49 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000c to c-9 (2012)). 
240. Id., tit. 7, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701–16, 78 Stat. at 253–66 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012)). 
241. Id., tit. 1, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 101, 78 Stat. at 241–42 (codified as amended
at 52 U.S.C. § 10101 (2012)). 
242. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89–110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 52 U.S.C.).  Many restrictions on voting enacted by
several states prior to the 2012 presidential election were eerily similar to forms of
discrimination used during Jim Crow to prevent blacks from voting.  In a 2012 report, the 
NAACP detailed the numerous efforts by state governments across the nation, particularly
in the south, to disfranchise African Americans.  See NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, 
INC. & NAACP, DEFENDING DEMOCRACY: CONFRONTING MODERN BARRIERS TO VOTING 
RIGHTS IN AMERICA (2011), http://naacp.3cdn.net/67065c25be9ae43367_mlbrsy48b.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/ZG3V-VDK2].  Although these efforts are executed in the name of
politics and are facially neutral, they have a significant disparate impact on blacks. See id. 
at 11–38.  Some are clearly targeted toward African Americans, Hispanics, and the poor. 
See id. at 37–38. For a sample of the disfranchisement measures detailed in the NAACP 
report, see id. at 11–13 
Florida and Texas have enacted laws that substantially restrict voter registration drives 
that work to the detriment of black voters many of whom rely heavily on these drives to
register.  In Florida, nearly twenty percent of blacks, more than any other group, register 
through voter registration drives.  Id. at 11 (citing Letter from League of Women Voters 
of Fla. et al. to Chris Herren, Chief, Voting Section, Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice 
12 (July 15, 2011), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Democracy/ 
Florida%20Section%205%20comment%20letter%20-%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
ZZT4-89LV]).  Also, many poor blacks register to vote at public assistance agencies— 
three times more often than poor white voters.  Id. at 16 (citing Voting and Registration in
the Election of November 2008—Detailed Tables, U.S.CENSUSBUREAU, https://www.census.gov/ 
hhes/www/socdemo/voting/publications/p20/2008/tables.html [https://perma.cc/EP3T-JUJ2]). 
States are required by federal law to provide voter registration services at state public 
assistance agencies.  National Voter Registration Act (NVRA), Pub. L. 103-31, § 7, 107 
Stat. 77, 80 (codified at as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 20506 (2012)).  Yet, Louisiana, Georgia, 
Texas, and other states have failed to comply with the NVRA. NAACP LEGAL DEF. &  
EDUC. FUND, INC. & NAACP, supra, at 12. 
Some states have limited the time and place individuals can register to vote, all to the 
detriment of blacks.  Florida, Ohio, Wisconsin, and Maine have enacted such laws.  Id. at
862 
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12. Ohio, for example, repealed a law that provided a one-week period in which individuals
could both register and vote at the same time. Id.  The elimination of this law falls
disproportionately on black voters who have used it more than other groups in the past. 
Id. 
Several states have enhanced their eligibility requirements for voting.  Alabama, Kansas, 
and Tennessee have enacted laws that require documentary proof of citizenship before one 
can register to vote. Id.  This facially neutral requirement will fall more harshly on older
African Americans because many were born in the Jim Crow Era, when most blacks were 
born at home without birth certificates, as they were denied access to hospitals or did not 
have enough money to pay for a hospital delivery. Id. (citing New State Voting Laws:
Barriers to the Ballot?: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, 
and Human Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 9 (Sept. 8, 2011)
(statement of Ryan P. Haygood, Director, Political Participation Group, NAACP LDF),
http://www.naacpldf.org/files/case_issue/Final%20Voting%20Barriers%20Testimony2C 
%20September%2012C%202011%20_400__2.pdf [http://perma.cc/5XD2-QFZJ]).  The
same result occurs with laws in states like Wisconsin that lengthen the period of time one
must be a resident of the state before becoming eligible to vote.  Id. These durational
residency requirements disproportionately affect blacks, who tend to move more frequently
than whites.  Id. (citing PAUL TAYLOR ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CTR., AMERICAN MOBILITY: 
WHO MOVES? WHO STAYS PUT? WHERE’S HOME? 22 (2008), http://www.pewsocial
trends.org/files/2010/10/Movers-and-Stayers.pdf [http://perma.cc/C4Z3-34E9]). 
The Florida and Iowa legislatures have passed laws that deny the franchise to convicted 
felons. Id. at 26–27.  Ex-felons who have served their sentences are permanently denied
the right to vote.  Id. at 12. As African Americans have disproportionately high rates of
felony convictions and incarcerations, these laws will disfranchise thousands of black
citizens. Id. 
Florida, Mississippi, and several other states have taken steps to purge voters from the 
registration rolls.  Id.  While the stated purpose of voter purges is to maintain the purity of
the lists of eligible voters by removing the names of ineligible individuals, eligible voters 
are often purged from the lists. Id.  A ninety-one year-old war hero, for instance, was 
stricken from the rolls in Florida.  Greg Allen, World War II Vet Caught Up in Florida’s 
Voter Purge Controversy, NPR.ORG (May 31, 2013, 1:56 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/
itsallpolitics/2012/05/31/154020289/world-war-ii-vet-caught-up-in-floridas-voter-purge­
controversy [http://perma.cc/RHV2-GTTM]. That state’s purging program has been so 
flawed that 12,000 voters have been erroneously flagged or purged.  NAACP LEGAL DEF. 
& EDUC. FUND, INC. & NAACP, supra, at 12.  Over seventy percent of these voters have 
been black or Latino.  Id. (citing WENDY WEISER & MARGARET CHEN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR 
JUSTICE, RECENT VOTER SUPPRESSION INCIDENTS 2 (2008), http://brennan.3cdn.net/e8272 
30204c5668706_p0m6b54jk.pdf [http://perma.cc/YC6A-HBGJ]). 
Florida, Georgia, Ohio, Tennessee, and West Virginia passed legislation that substantially
reduced the opportunities for early voting. Id. The period for early voting was cut almost 
in half, from fourteen to eight days, in Florida. Id. Again, this facially neutral move falls 
more heavily on blacks than whites as they are more likely than whites to use the early
voting process. Id.  Although only thirteen percent of the Florida electorate, blacks accounted 
for twenty-two percent of the early voters therein during the 2008 general election.  Id. 
(citing Letter from NAACP LDF to Chris Herren, Chief, Voting Section, Civil Rights Div.,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice 4 (June 17, 2011), http://naacpldf.org/files/case_issue/2011-06-17%20
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Housing Act makes it illegal for certain property owners, real estate agencies, 
and lenders to discriminate “because of race, [or] color” in the sale or 
rental of housing.243 Finally, the 1972 amendments to Title VII of the 1964 
Civil Rights Act, inter alia, strengthened the Equal Employment Opportunities 
Commission, the government agency charged with enforcing Title VII, by
giving it the power to investigate and prosecute charges of employment
discrimination, making Title VII more than just a toothless tiger, and by 
extending the prohibition against employment discrimination to states and
local governmental entities.244  The latter revision made employment
discrimination unlawful in states that had not already enacted employment
discrimination laws.  As the Supreme Court has noted, “Racial discrimination 
by public employers was not made illegal under Title VII until March 24, 
1972.”245  The 1972 amendments brought an official end to the Jim Crow
era and began the post-civil rights era.246 
Vindicating the racial integration tenet, many federal statutes also 
permit the use of racial preferences as a remedy for past discrimination. 
Title VII, for example, permits employers to establish race-conscious
affirmative action policies under such circumstances.247  The 1965 Voting 
LDF%20joint%20statement%20to%20AG%20regarding%20Florida%20election%20law 
s%20.PDF [http://perma.cc/Q3D2-87Z3]). 
Finally, several states have passed laws requiring voters to present a government-issued 
photo ID at the polls on election day.  Among these states are Alabama, Texas, Mississippi,
South Carolina, Kansas, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Wisconsin.  Id. at 12–13. These laws 
have a tremendous disfranchisement effect on the American people, as eleven percent of 
voting-age citizens, approximately 22.9 million people, do not have a government-issued 
photo ID.  Id. at 13 (citing BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, CITIZENS WITHOUT PROOF: A SURVEY 
OF AMERICANS’ POSSESSION OF DOCUMENTARY PROOF OF CITIZENSHIP AND PHOTO
IDENTIFICATION 3 (2006), http://www.brennancenter.org/page/-/d/download_file_39242.pdf
[http://perma.cc/AAS6-7QEE]).  They are especially devastating for blacks, as 25 percent 
of black voting age citizens (over six million people) do not possess a valid government-
issued photo ID.  Id. 
The NAACP report also highlights federal and state attempts to weaken the Voting Rights
Act of 1965. Id. at 39–40. Sections 2 and 5 are the most important provisions of the Act. 
Many of these facially neutral voting measures smack of voting techniques used throughout the
south during Jim Crow to deny the right to vote or to reduce the voting power of blacks. 
243. Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 804(a), 82 Stat. 81, 83 (1968) (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 3604 (2012)). 
244. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103
(codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (Supp. V. 1975)); see Brooks,
supra note 23, at 259 (discussing the 1972 Amendments). 
245.  Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 309 (1977). 
246. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (Supp. V 1975); BROOKS, supra note 9, at 
xii. 
247. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara Cty., 480 U.S. 616 (1987) 
(voluntary); Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421
(1986) (involuntary).  See generally, ROY L. BROOKS ET AL., CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION: 
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Rights Act authorizes the creation of “majority-minority voting districts,” 
a form of affirmative action, to remedy historic patterns of voting 
discrimination.248  The 1968 Fair Housing Act has in the past permitted 
affirmative action housing policy on a limited basis.249 
Statutory antidiscrimination and racial preference laws are triggered by
the “intent test” and, sometimes, the “effects test.”  The former test requires 
the plaintiff to show that the defendant, whether it be a private party
or governmental entity, purposefully made a race-conscious decision that
disadvantages the plaintiff.250  The effects test requires the plaintiff to 
show that the defendant used a racially neutral policy or practice that 
“fall[s] more harshly” on the plaintiff’s civil-rights class than on one or 
CASES AND PERSPECTIVES 1203–34 (3d ed. 2005) (discussing Supreme Court cases 
regarding voluntary and involuntary affirmative action under statutory law). 
248. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 905–06 (1995) (discussing the
purpose of the Voting Rights Act); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 640–41 (1993) (same). 
Although jurisdictions may continue to take race into account when drawing election 
districts, the Supreme Court requires a strong justification if racial considerations 
predominate over traditional districting principles. See Ala. Legis. Black Caucus v.
Alabama, No. 13-895, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1270–73 (Mar. 25, 2015) (holding, inter alia, that 
the district court failed to properly calculate “predominance” in its alternative holding that 
race was not the predominant motivating factor in the creation of any of the challenged 
districts, that the district court’s other alternative holding—that the challenged districts
would satisfy strict scrutiny—rests on a misperception of the law; specifically, Section 5 
of the Voting Rights Act does not require a covered jurisdiction to maintain a particular
numerical minority percentage.  Instead, it requires the jurisdiction to maintain a minority’s 
ability to elect a preferred candidate of choice); Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 
2631 (2013) (holding that § 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act was unconstitutional as it applied 
an outdated formula to determine which states and counties were covered entities under §
5 of the Act). See generally, BROOKS ET AL., supra note 247, at 557–678 (discussing the 
development of the right to vote). 
249. These are “access” quotas designed to increase minority participation in housing
as opposed to “ceiling” quotas used to regulate the racial composition of a housing 
complex.  The latter is typically referred to as “racial occupancy controls” or “managed
integration.” See, e.g., South-Suburban Hous. Ctr. v. Greater S. Suburban Bd. of Realtors,
935 F.2d 868, 871, 882–83, 899 (7th Cir. 1991) (special outreach marketing did not 
necessarily limit access); United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d 1096, 1101–02 
(2d Cir. 1988) (noting that access quotas are generally upheld, while ceiling quotas are “of
doubtful validity”).  See generally, BROOKS ET AL., supra note 247, at 282–336, 318–20
(discussing the Fair Housing Act in general, and specifically affirmative action in the
context of housing). 
250. See, e.g., Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 52–53 (2003) (disparate 
treatment claims require proof of discriminatory intent). 
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more of the other civil-rights classes.251  Because whites constitute a civil-
rights class (a “protected class”), these laws also protect them.252 
Like statutory law, constitutional law enforces formal equal opportunity
through the creation of antidiscrimination and racial preference laws.  In 
constitutional law, the “strict scrutiny test” has become the Supreme 
Court’s chief means of enforcing the racial omission and racial integration 
tenets. A two-prong equal-protection test, the strict scrutiny test prohibits 
a governmental entity from intentionally—the intent test—using a racial 
classification unless the classification is narrowly tailored—commonly 
called the “means prong” or “means test”—to serve a compelling state or 
governmental purpose—commonly called the “ends prong” or “ends test”.253 
Imbued with the constitutional authority of the Equal Protection Clause,
the strict scrutiny test is intended to severely limit the use of race in the 
formulation of public law or policy.254  To that extent, the strict scrutiny 
test promotes the racial omission tenet.255 
Implicit in the strict scrutiny test is the constitutional authorization for 
the use of racial preferences by governmental entities.  These institutions 
have constitutional permission to intentionally use a racial classification 
that would otherwise be discriminatory only if the classification meets the 
strict scrutiny’s means and ends tests—it must be as narrowly tailored to
 251. Id. (quoting Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335
n.15 (1977)). 
252. See, e.g., McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 278–79 (1976) 
(reasoning Title VII terms are not limited to any particular race and that the EEOC 
consistently interprets that title to apply to discrimination against whites, as well as against 
nonwhites); see generally, BROOKS ET AL., supra note 247, at 261–81, 375–556 (discussing
discrimination in public accommodation and employment). 
253. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (remanding 
Caucasian student’s suit against a university for discrimination against her on the basis of
race because the Fifth Circuit did not apply strict scrutiny to her claims); Parents Involved 
in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (school districts’ use of 
racial classifications as a “tiebreaker” to promote diversity was unconstitutional because 
districts failed to meet high bar for justifying racial discrimination); Johnson v. California, 
543 U.S. 499 (2005) (strict scrutiny governed inmate’s racial discrimination claim against 
prison); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (selection method favoring “underrepresented” 
groups violated Equal Protection clause); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (narrowly
tailored admissions program, although race-conscious, served a compelling interest and
was therefore constitutional).
 254. See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis 
of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 802–05 (2006).  But see 
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (expressing the majority’s 
“wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is ‘strict in theory, but fatal in fact’”). 
255. See, e.g., BROOKS ET AL., supra note 247, at 1235–1312 (providing background 
on the use of strict scrutiny by the courts); SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 231, at 531– 
76. 
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serve a compelling governmental purpose.256  Few racial classifications
pass the strict scrutiny test.  Basically, the Supreme Court recognizes only
two compelling state interests regarding race-conscious programs designed
to assist blacks: the desire to remedy an institution’s own past discrimination 
and the desire to maintain a diverse student body.  In sanctioning affirmative
action, the strict scrutiny test, to that extent, promotes the racial integration 
tenet.257  Mediating the tension between the racial omission tenet and the
racial integration tenet, the strict scrutiny test typically favors the former
tenet. The racial omission tenet trumps the racial integration tenet in most
constitutional, as well as most statutory cases.
In sum, statutory and constitutional civil rights law can be divided into 
antidiscrimination law, prohibiting racial discrimination, and racial preference 
law, permitting racial preferences as an exception to said prohibition.
Antidiscrimination law, whether statutory or constitutional, primarily seeks 
to enforce the racial omission side of formal equal opportunity.  Statutory
antidiscrimination law is invoked by the intent test and sometimes by the
effects test. Constitutional antidiscrimination law operates through the
 256. See Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2422 (Thomas, J., concurring) (internal citation 
omitted) (“Under strict scrutiny, all racial classifications are categorically prohibited
unless they are ‘necessary to further a compelling governmental interest’ and ‘narrowly
tailored to that end.’”  (quoting Johnson, 543 U.S. at 514)); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326 (“[Strict
scrutiny] means that such classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly
tailored to further compelling governmental interests.”); Adarand Constructors, Inc., 515 
U.S. at 227 (“[A]ll racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local
governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny. In other 
words, such classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures 
that further compelling governmental interests.”). 
257. See, e.g., Fisher, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (remanding Caucasian student’s suit against a 
university for discrimination against her on the basis of race because the Fifth Circuit did
not apply strict scrutiny to her claims); Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs., 551 U.S. 701
(school districts’ use of racial classifications as a “tiebreaker” to promote diversity was 
unconstitutional because districts failed to meet high bar for justifying racial discrimination);
Gratz, 539 U.S. 244 (selection method favoring “underrepresented” groups violated Equal 
Protection clause); Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (narrowly tailored admissions program, although
race-conscious, served a compelling interest and was therefore constitutional); Adarand
Constructors, Inc., 515 U.S. 200 (applying strict scrutiny to racial classifications in 
awarding government contracts); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 
(1989) (holding city failed to show a compelling government interest justifying plan
requiring contractors to award subcontracts to minorities); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. 
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (allowing measured use of race as an admissions criterion); 
see also BROOKS ET AL., supra note 247, at 1197–1318 (providing an overview of the historical 
development of and current law regarding affirmative action); SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, 
supra note 231. 
 867 



















strict scrutiny test, which incorporates the intent test.  Racial preference law,
whether statutory or constitutional, primarily seeks to enforce the racial
integration tenet.  It operates as an exception to the intent test statutorily and
the strict scrutiny test constitutionally. 
These laws have governed the Supreme Court’s decision-making in
both the civil rights and post-civil rights periods.  Here’s the rub: racial 
dynamics have changed since the civil rights era, not a little but a lot.258 
New black equality interests challenge the old interests.  Dialogue about 
the American race problem needs to keep up with the times. It must become
more sophisticated, shifting from discrimination discourse to subordination
discourse. 
B. Post-Civil Rights Period 
1. The Problem: Changing Racial Dynamics 
Racial conditions in contemporary American society are quite different 
from what they were at the time of Brown and during the civil rights era.
The Supreme Court in 1954 was dealing with a system of American
Apartheid. The South had Jim Crow laws and the North, for the most part, 
had Jim Crow practices.  For example, blacks in the South were prohibited 
not only from going to the same schools as whites, but also from eating in 
the same restaurants, drinking out of the same public water fountains, 
entering the same restrooms, or watching movies seated next to whites in 
theaters.259  Common signage at the time warned: “Whites Only”; “Restrooms
for Colored”; “No Dogs or Niggers”; “Colored Waiting Room”; and “Staff 
and Negroes Use Back Entrance.”260  Blacks could be lynched for such
infractions as attempting to register to vote, filing a lawsuit against a white 
person or a black man making eye contact with a white woman—“eyeball
rape.”261  Lynching was more than hanging.  It typically had a prelude and 
finale, the former consisting of torture, burning, maiming, and dismemberment, 
258. For a detailed discussion of these changes see, for example, BROOKS, supra note 
9, at x–xiii (contrasting the discrimination experienced by black Americans in the past 
with current instances of racial discrimination, including capital deficiencies and disparity
in opportunities). 
259. Id. at xi.
260. See, e.g., REMEMBERING JIM CROW: AFRICAN AMERICANS TELL ABOUT LIFE IN 
THE SEGREGATED SOUTH 5, 6, 10, 39, 110, 131, 166, 181, 232, 236 (William H. Chafe, 
Raymond Gavins, & Robert Korstad eds., 2001) (illustrating various forms of segregation 
and discrimination in the Jim Crow South). 
261. Id. at xii. 
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and the latter consisting of such “souvenirs” as ears, nose, lips, genitals, 
and other body parts.262 
In 1972, the racial dynamics of American society changed significantly 
and for the better.  Jim Crow died with the passage of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972,263 the Civil Rights Movement as well as the civil
rights period ended, and what scholars call the post-civil rights period 
began.  Some four decades into the post-civil rights period, blacks have 
experienced unprecedented success individually, including the election
and reelection of a black President of the United States.  Yet capital
deficiencies—financial, human, and social—continue to overwhelm the 
vast majority of African Americans.264  While formal equal opportunity— 
the racial omission and racial integration tenets—was seen as an effective 
and fair response to Jim Crow, many scholars today question its soundness 
in our current racial environment.  Indeed, at least four distinct post-civil 
rights theories speak to the question of formal equal opportunity’s utility
in civil rights cases and, more broadly, our post-civil rights society: 
traditionalism; reformism; limited separation; and critical race theory. 
Each theory proceeds from a very distinct belief, orientation, or norm 
regarding the best strategy for racial advancement in contemporary American 
society.  Traditionalists believe that race no longer matters in our post-
civil rights society; ergo, FEO is conceptually sound, provided that the racial
omission tenet trumps the racial integration tenet in civil rights cases, as 
is traditionally the case.  Reformists proceed from the opposite posture.
They believe race still matters in post-civil rights America; ergo FEO is
conceptually sound but operationally flawed, precisely because the racial
integration tenet does not routinely prevail over the racial omission tenet.  
Limited separatists start from the normative position that racial solidarity 
262. See, e.g., PHILIP DRAY, AT THE HANDS OF PERSONS UNKNOWN: THE LYNCHING
OF BLACK AMERICA (2002) (describing how lynching was used by whites to institute a 
reign of terror over black Americans); CHARLES S. MANGUM, JR., THE LEGAL STATUS OF
THE NEGRO (The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 2008) (1940) (reviewing statutes and cases 
concerning post-Civil War race relations); NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF
COLORED PEOPLE, THIRTY YEARS OF LYNCHING IN THE UNITED STATES, 1889–1918 (Negro 
Universities Press 1969) (1919) (discussing the shameful presence of lynchings in
American history); REMEMBERING JIM CROW, supra note 260 (collecting interviews of
firsthand accounts of the atrocities perpetuated against black southerners); Sherrilyn A. 
Ifill, Creating a Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Lynching, 21 LAW & INEQ. 263, 
282–86 (2003) (presenting the horrific details of lynchings). 
263. BROOKS, supra note 9, at xii; Roy L. Brooks, The Crisis of the Black Politician 
in the Age of Obama, 53 HOW. L.J. 699, 727–31 (2010). 
264. BROOKS, supra note 9, at 125–83. 
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matters most; ergo, FEO is conceptually unsound because it leaves no 
room for racial separation. Finally, critical race theorists’ core post-civil
rights belief is that white hegemony matters most; ergo, FEO is conceptually 
unsound as it protects and perpetuates white privilege and it offers no 
social transformation. 
From these very different post-civil rights theories, we get very different 
articulations of the black equality interest, from which determinations of
juridical subordination can be made.  Traditionalists define the black
equality interest as racial omission—colorblind judicial decision-making 
is the best path for racial advancement in today’s society—and would,
accordingly, find juridical subordination whenever the Supreme Court
suppresses the racial omission tenet.  Reformists define the black equality
interest as racial integration—diversity-driven judicial decision-making is
the best strategy for racial advancement—and would, as a result, find juridical 
subordination whenever the Supreme Court suppresses the racial integration
tenet. Limited separatists define the black equality interest as racial
solidarity—judicial decision-making that supports black institutions is the
best prescription for racial advancement—and would, consequently, find 
juridical subordination whenever the Supreme Court suppressed or perhaps 
failed to support benign racial identity.  Finally, critical race theorists
define the black equality interest as social transformation—judicial decision-
making that strikes a blow against white hegemony—and would, accordingly, 
find juridical subordination whenever the Supreme Court suppressed efforts
to bring about social transformation. 
Determining juridical subordination is a complex process of analysis in 
post-civil rights America because the black equality interest today is subject 
to multiple conceptualizations.  Notwithstanding such complexity, the 
Supreme Court and lower federal courts must make this calculation.  They
must engage subordination discourse to further racial advancement and, 
hence, good social policy, in our post-civil rights society.  What follows 
is a more detailed explanation of the calculations that go into the multifarious 
determinations of juridical subordination. 
2. Black Equality Interest and Subordination 
a. Traditionalism 
Traditionalism’s basic orientation toward the American race problem,
its core belief about racial relations and black progress, is quite simple: 
race no longer matters.265  Adherents of this post-civil rights theory are
clearly not saying that racism does not exist; they are saying that the 
265. See id. at 14–34. 
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racism that does exist does not prevent African Americans or any other
ethnic group from achieving worldly success and personal happiness in
our post-civil rights society.  Similarly, they are clearly not saying that
African Americans face no problems today; they are saying that the problems 
African Americans face in today’s society are self-inflicted.  These problems 
are internal, not external; they are cultural, not racial.266 
Given this core belief about black equality in post-civil rights America, 
one can easily imagine that traditionalists are largely in sync with the civil
rights-era conceptualization of the black equality interest.  They would 
seem to have an overall favorable regard for formal equal opportunity’s
design for racial advancement. Formal equal opportunity still makes good 
sense to them.  It is a civil rights policy, or strategy for racial advancement,
that it is both conceptually and operationally sound.  The only caveat is 
that each tenet must be strictly applied; in other words, the racial integration 
tenet must always be enforced in a racially neutral fashion.  It must never 
cross paths with the racial omission tenet in application.  If, however, their 
paths do cross through an ill-advised attempt to bring about racial integration
in a race-conscious manner, then the racial omission tenet must trump.
Blacks and society as a whole are better off when we do not pollute the 
social environment by making too much fuss about race when, in fact,
race no longer matters.  Race-conscious policies are racially divisive, pure 
and simple. 
This thinking, indeed, provides the subtext for most of the Supreme 
Court’s decision-making in civil rights cases since the end of the civil 
rights period. The Court simply does not want to make too much of the 
problem of race in our society.267  Our judgment that traditionalists have
a strong preference for the racial omission tenet comes not only by implication
 266. See id. at 1–13. 
267. See, e.g., Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration, &
Immigration Rights & Fight for Equal. by Any Means Necessary, 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014) 
(no federal authority could bar state constitutional amendment prohibiting affirmative 
action); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (remanding Caucasian
student’s suit against a university for discrimination against her on the basis of race because the
Fifth Circuit did not apply strict scrutiny to her claims); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 
(2003) (narrowly tailored admissions program, although race-conscious, served a compelling
interest and was therefore constitutional); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 
(1989) (holding city failed to show a compelling government interest justifying plan
requiring contractors to award subcontracts to minorities); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (applying strict scrutiny to racial classifications in awarding 
government contracts); see also Larry Alexander & Maimon Schwarzchild, Race Matters, 
29 CONST. COMMENT. 31 (2013) (arguing that too much attention is given to the race issue).
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from their core post-civil rights belief, but also directly from the lips of 
some well-known traditionalists.  Chief Justice Roberts is a steadfast 
traditionalist. He writes: “Simply because the school districts may seek a 
worthy goal does not mean they are free to discriminate on the basis of
race to achieve it. . . .  The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race 
is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”268  George Will, another
traditionalist, strongly believes not only that race no longer matters, but also 
that race only matters when the government uses it in policymaking.  Whether 
invidious or benign, “negative” or “positive,” race-conscious governmental
policies are discriminatory and, hence “racist.”269 
Based upon the traditionalists’ view about formal equal opportunity, 
especially the emphasis they give to the racial omission tenet in furthering 
the black equality interest, it is reasonable to conclude that traditionalists 
would find juridical subordination whenever courts suppress the racial
omission tenet, even in favor of blacks.  Giving blacks special treatment
is not only racially divisive, but it also signals to society that blacks are 
hapless victims in need of special treatment.  Such treatment undercuts 
the black equality interest by depicting blacks as a people less than equal 
to whites. Blacks are akin to wards of the state.  Racial charity undermines 
racial equality. 
b. Reformism 
Reformists operate from a different post-civil rights perspective than
traditionalists. Glenn Loury, a one-time traditionalist, argues that the 
traditionalist belief that “[i]t’s time to move on” is “simplistic social ethics 
and sophomoric social psychology.”270  When reformists look at the
American race problem, they see a problem of race, rather than a narrower 
problem that inheres in the culture of the lowest socio-economic class in
black America. 
For reformists, race still matters, just the opposite of what traditionalists 
believe, because, inter alia, even though we have a black president, the 
most powerful person in the world lacks the power to raise racial issues 
with a strong voice in his own administration.271  General Mills reports a
268. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U. S. 701, 743, 
748 (2007). 
269. See George F. Will, Why Civil Rights No Longer Are Rights, SAN DIEGO UNION­
TRIB., Mar. 10, 2005, at B12. 
270. GLENN C. LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY 144 (2002). 
271. For instance, President Barack Obama was severely rebuked by the media when
he saw racism in the arrest of a renowned black Harvard professor and friend of the 
president, Henry Louis Gates, by a white police officer, Sgt. James Crowley of the
Cambridge, Mass., Police Department.  Helene Cooper, Obama Criticizes Arrest of a 
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strong racist response to its 2013 commercial showing an interracial 
family eating its iconic cereal, Cheerios.272 Backstage racism, such as that 
revealed by former NBA owner Donald Sterling in a private conservation, 
seems more prevalent than front-stage racism—racism expressed in
public places.273  Smoking-gun evidence of African American claims of 
racist cops can be found not only in the Department of Justice (DOJ) 
report on Ferguson,274 but also in Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
Director James Comey’s  acknowledgment of the “hard truth” that racial 
bias is a fact of life among police officers policing black communities.275 
Yes, there is black–on–black crime, but traditionalists fail to point out that 
FBI statistics show that the rate of white on white crime is virtually identical 
to the rate of black–on–black crime, reformists argue.276  Reformists want
Harvard Professor, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/23/us/ 
politics/23gates.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/ALX9-FRLS]; Toby Harnden, Barack Obama’s 
Support Falls Among White Votes, TELEGRAPH (Aug. 2, 2009), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/worldnews/barackobama/5961624/Barack-Obamas-support-falls-among-white-voters. 
html [http://perma.cc/LL7M-4N5K]; Michael A. Fletcher & Michael D. Shear, Obama
Voices Regret to Policeman, WASH. POST (July 25, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost. 
com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/24/AR2009072400451.html [http://perma.cc/BJ4Q­
HRA2]; Krissah Thompson & Cheryl W. Thompson, Officer Tells His Side of the Story in 
Arrest of Harvard Scholar, WASH. POST (July 24, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost. 
com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/23/AR2009072301073.html [http://perma.cc/NYN9- 
NDGA].
 272. Stuart Elliott, Vitriol Online for Cheerios Ad with Interracial Family, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 31, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/01/business/media/cheerios-ad­
with-interracial-family-brings-out-internet-hate.html [http://perma.cc/8M84-P2UR]. 
273. See, e.g., LESLIE HOUTS PICA & JOE R. FEAGIN, TWO-FACED RACISM: WHITES IN
THE BACKSTAGE AND FRONTSTAGE (2007) (positing that most actual expression of racism
is done in private settings, particularly among social groups). 
274. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON
POLICE DEPARTMENT 5, 18, 62, 65 (2015), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/ 
press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf [http://perma. 
cc/LH8B-RDSL]. 
275. James B. Comey, Director, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Address at Georgetown
University (Feb. 12, 2015), http://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/hard-truths-law-enforcement­
and-race [http://perma.cc/6UJB-HKD8]. 
276. See BROOKS, supra note 9, at 32–33 (“In 2002, for example, 74.5% of violent 
crimes perpetrated against African Americans were committed by other African Americans. In
that same year, however, 72.6% of violent crimes perpetrated against whites were 
committed by other whites.”  (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 2002 STATISTICAL TABLES, at
tbl. 42, http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cvus02.pdf [http://perma.cc/2R6G-LEJK])).
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the Supreme Court to be more sensitive to the racially disadvantaging
effects of these and other racialized conditions.277 
But reformists are not revolutionaries.  “With due humility,” reformist
Glenn Loury insists, “I am a reformer, not an ‘abolitionist[.]’”278  Hence, 
reformists, like traditionalists, would seem to embrace formal equal
opportunity in concept.  Racial omission and racial integration are fine in
concept in our post-civil rights, post-Jim Crow society.  The difference 
lies in their views as to the way in which the Supreme Court typically applies
these tenets. Traditionalists believe formal equal opportunity, although 
conceptually sound, is operationally flawed.  It is flawed in that way because
the Court does not place enough emphasis on the racial integration
tenet in its administration of both racial preference and antidiscrimination 
law.  Reformists want more, rather than less, racial integration, even if that 
means more race-conscious, less colorblind decision-making. Black
equality is most enhanced through racial integration, as the mainstream is
where the best of everything is—the best schools, jobs, and so on.279  The 
difference between reformists and traditionalists, in short, lies in the relative 
emphasis given to the racial omission and racial integration tenets. For
traditionalists, the racial omission tenet trumps the racial integration tenet. 
For reformists, the racial integration tenet trumps the racial omission tenet. 
Given the strong belief that race still matters—Justice Sotomayer begins
one of her dissenting opinions by borrowing from the title of reformist
Cornel West’s book, Race Matters280—juridical subordination under
reformism can be defined as the suppression of the racial integration tenet. 
Such racial subordination is manifested most frequently when the Supreme
Court curtails racial preference law. Race-conscious affirmative action is 
277.  For further discussion of how race still matters, see id. at 37–53. 
278. LOURY, supra note 270, at 121. 
279. For example, on average, segregated schools are “inferior in terms of the quality
of their teachers, the character of the curriculum, the level of competition, average test
scores, and graduation rates.”  Brenna Lermon Hill, Comment, A Call to Congress: Amend 
Education Legislation and Ensure That President Obama’s “Race to the Top” Leaves No 
Child Behind, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 1177, 1184 (2014) (quoting GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI
LEE, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, HISTORICAL REVERSALS, ACCELERATING RESEGREGATION, 




280. See Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration, & Immigration 
Rights & Fight for Equal by Any Means Necessary, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1651, 1676 (2014) 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see also CORNEL WEST, RACE MATTERS (2d ed. 2001) (calling
on both races to recognize that racism and race are woven into American history and must 
be acknowledged). 
874 













   
  










[VOL. 52:  825, 2015] Juridical Subordination 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
the strongest implementation of the racial integration tenet.281  Similarly, 
juridical subordination occurs in antidiscrimination law when the Court
makes it difficult for plaintiffs to bring or win cases that would bolster racial 
integration. Antidiscrimination law—the prohibition against discrimination on
the basis of race or color282—is the gateway to integrating American 
institutions. 
c. Limited Separation 
Limited separatists have a clear post-civil rights orientation, a clear 
understanding of what matters most in the quest for black equality in
today’s society: racial solidarity.  Racial self-sufficiency is the sine qua 
non of racial advancement for African Americans.  Yet, blacks, limited
separatists believe, suffer from a dearth of racial unity—a paucity of racial
pride. Blacks are too preoccupied with gaining acceptance from whites 
or making their fame and fortune in white institutions.  Hence, there is not
enough black pride, black heritage, black solidarity, and self-reliance.283 
Given this post-civil rights perspective, one can safely surmise that 
limited separatists have an unfavorable opinion of formal equal opportunity.  
Both tenets—racial omission and racial integration—are conceptually
incompatible with limited separatists’ core message of racial solidarity, a 
message that is both race-conscious and out of sync with racial integration. 
Thus, unlike traditionalists and reformists, limited separatists reject formal 
equal opportunity at the conceptual level.  Formal equal opportunity, in 
the view of limited separatists, is at best an inchoate post-civil rights policy 
and at worst a dangerous post-civil rights policy in the context of today’s 
post-civil rights society. 
281. See MINOW, supra note 214; Philip C. Aka, The Supreme Court and Affirmative 
Action in Public Education, with Special Reference to the Michigan Cases, 2006 BYU 
EDUC. & L.J. 1, 5–6 (2006); Leslie Yalof Garfield, Back to Bakke: Defining the Strict
Scrutiny Test for Affirmative Action Policies Aimed at Achieving Diversity in the Classroom, 
83 NEB. L. REV. 631, 684 (2005); David Orentlicher, Diversity: A Fundamental American
Principle, 70  MO.L.  REV. 777, 812 (2005); see, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)
(narrowly tailored admissions program, although race-conscious, served a compelling
interest and was therefore constitutional); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200
(1995) (applying strict scrutiny to racial classifications in awarding government contracts); 
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (allowing measured use of 
race as an admissions criterion). 
282. See supra text accompanying notes 220–24. 
283. See BROOKS, supra note 9, at 73–74. 
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Even during the civil rights era, many African Americans viewed the 
concepts of racial omission and racial integration with suspicion. While 
African Americans in general initially greeted the Supreme Court’s decision
in Brown with exuberance, a fair amount of apprehension set in among
many blacks, especially in the South, upon sober reflection.  The fear was 
that formal equal opportunity might mean the closure of black institutions 
or the end to public funding of such institutions.284  The NAACP lawyers
who argued Brown were aware of these concerns, but dismissed them as 
unfounded.285  However, the fears have, by and large, proven to be true.286 
Indeed, the Supreme Court simply does not place much value in maintaining
or creating black institutions.  For most of the post-civil rights period, it has
waged a sustained war against publicly funded black institutions on the 
ground that they make a mockery of Brown. For example, the Court
placed Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs), which are
quintessential black institutions, under a constitutional duty to dismantle 
their racial identity in deference to the color-blind tenet.  In United States 
284. See discussion infra, note 286. 
285. See CARTER, supra note 5, at 156–57, 172.  In addition, some civil rights scholars 
see implicit racism in Brown’s assertion that separate is inherently unequal. See infra note 
293 and accompanying text. 
286.  Testimony before the United States Senate indicated that perhaps a majority of
African American principals and teachers did lose their jobs. See Kevin D. Brown, 
Review: Robert L. Carter, A Matter of Law: A Memoir of Struggle in the Cause of Equal 
Rights, 31 VT. L. REV. 925, 939 (2007) (citing Displacement and Present Status of Black 
School Principals in Desegregated School Districts: Hearings Before the Select Comm. 
on Equal Educ. Opportunity of the U.S. S., 92d Cong. 4906–07 (1971) (statement of Dr. 
Benjamin Epstein, Assistant Superintendent in Charge of Secondary Education, Newark,
New Jersey)); see also  ALVIS V. ADAIR, DESEGREGATION: THE ILLUSION OF BLACK
PROGRESS (1984) (discussing the impact of desegregation on African Americans); 
DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 102, 
109 (1987) (citing Brief for Nat’l Educ. Assoc. as Amicus Curiae, United States v.
Georgia, 445 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1971) (No. 30-338) (providing empirical data on burden 
borne by black teachers, administrators, and students because of school integration)); 
JAMES E. BLACKWELL, THE BLACK COMMUNITY: DIVERSITY AND UNITY, 158–60 (2d ed. 
1985); HAROLD CRUSE, PLURAL BUT EQUAL: A  CRITICAL STUDY OF BLACKS AND
MINORITIES AND AMERICA’S PLURAL SOCIETY 22 (1987) (describing the “disservice” done 
to blacks by the NAACP’s rejection of compromise gestures—belated equalization of 
segregated school systems); ROY L. BROOKS, STRUCTURES OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING
FROM LEGAL FORMALISM TO CRITICAL THEORY 285, n.13 (2d ed. 2005) (sources cited 
therein); HARRELL R. RODGERS, JR. &  CHARLES S. BULLOCK, III, LAW AND SOCIAL 
CHANGE: CIVIL RIGHTS LAWS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES 94–97 (1972) (stating
desegregation often resulted in merely superficial changes and placed the burden on those 
it was intended to aid); David G. Carter, Second-Generation School Integration Problems 
for Blacks, 13 J. BLACK STUD. 175, 175–88 (1982) (examining the phenomenon of post-
Brown resegregation).  In addition to school closings, many of the integrated schools
experienced ”second-generation resegregation”—segregation within these schools—with 
the over placement of black students in slow-learner, such as “educable mentally retarded,” 
classes and white students in advanced classes. See BROOKS, supra note 209, at 77. 
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v. Fordice, the Supreme Court held that current policies traceable to de 
jure segregation that have a discriminatory effect “must be reformed to
the extent practicable and consistent with sound educational practices.”287 
Understanding the threat this standard—“racial identifiability” attributable
to de jure segregation—poses to the existence of HBCUs, Justice Clarence
Thomas, the lone black justice on the Court who, if nothing else, is proudly
black, attempted to spin the majority’s opinion in such a way as to save 
HBCUs.  The Court, he opined in a concurring opinion, “do[es] not foreclose 
the possibility that there exists ‘sound educational justification’ for maintaining 
historically black colleges as such.”288 
Despite Justice Thomas’ attempt to spin the holding in Fordice, subsequent 
attempts have been made to “desegregate” HBCUs.  Indeed, on remand in
Fordice, the lower court mandated colorblind admission standards at HBCUs 
and white colleges in the state of Mississippi.289  This ruling was made
over the vehement objection of blacks who argued that the new standards
would cut black enrollment in half at Mississippi’s three HBCUs.  The
Supreme Court denied an appeal in the case and, hence, refused to block 
the lower court’s ruling.290 
For limited separatists, Justice Harlan’s famous defense of the racial
omission tenet in his dissenting opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson illustrates 
the inadequacy of racial equality under formal equal opportunity.291 As
he set about defending the idea of a colorblind Constitution, Justice Harlan
assured the nation that America’s racial hierarchy would not change. The 
very same paragraph in which he embraced the colorblind Constitution 
opens with Justice Harlan avowing:
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country.  And so it is, 
in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth, and in power.  So, I doubt 
not, it will continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its great heritage, and
holds fast to the principles of constitutional liberty.292 
287.  505 U.S. 717, 729 (1992). 
288. Id. at 748 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
289.  Ayers v. Fordice, 879 F. Supp. 2d 1419, 1494 (N.D. Miss. 1995). 
290. Ayers v. Fordice, 522 U.S. 1084 (1998) (mem.).  The Court’s decision denying 
certiorari in the case is reported in an article written by Peter Applebone. Equal Entry 
Standards May Hurt Black Students in Mississippi, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Apr. 24, 
1996, at A10. 
291. 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494–95 (1954). 
292. Id. at 559 (emphasis added). 
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Limited separatists ask, rhetorically, how could anyone who truly cares 
about racial equality limit the black equality interest to formal equal 
opportunity? 
Given the importance of racial identity and solidarity to limited separatists, 
it is not difficult to glean a responsive definition of juridical subordination. 
The Supreme Court engages in juridical subordination when it suppresses 
racial identity or solidarity.  Justice Thomas seems to indicate that this
form of juridical subordination is quite typical: “It never ceases to amaze 
me that the courts are so willing to assume that anything that is
predominantly black must be inferior.”293  Although a core traditionalist, 
Justice Thomas has a clear understanding of and appreciation for the 
limited separatist concept of juridical subordination.294 
d. Critical Race Theory 
Critical race theory’s central post-civil rights message is that white 
hegemony matters most in the struggle for racial advancement.  Not unlike 
that of limited separation, this core belief translates into a condemnation 
of formal equal opportunity.  From the perspective of critical race theory, 
formal equal opportunity is conceptually unsound, dead on arrival, so never 
mind about its application.  Thus, unlike limited separatists or reformists for
that matter, critical race theorists do not believe formal equal opportunity’s
defects can be fixed by artful reconceptualization or clever application. 
The “animal” cannot be “tamed”; it must be “killed.” 
Critical race theory’s core message of white hegemony comes from an 
analytical framework that goes to the very structure of our society.  As
Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic assert, “critical race theory questions 
the very foundations of the liberal order, including equality theory, legal 
293. Missouri v. Jenkins (Jenkins III), 515 U.S. 70, 114 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added).  Some civil rights scholars see implicit racism in Brown’s 
assertion that separate is inherently unequal.  See, e.g., Kevin Brown, Has the Supreme 
Court Allowed the Cure for De Jure Segregation to Replicate the Disease?, 78 CORNELL
L. REV. 1, 4–6 (1992) (discussing de jure segregated public schools’ inconsistency with
constitutional values).  In a subsequent article, Professor Brown states:
I am one who firmly believes that what allowed Chief Justice Earl Warren to
produce an opinion that all the justices of the Supreme Court could agree upon 
was the notion that segregation damaged only black people.  Thus, I think the 
social science evidence was necessary because it allowed Warren to garner 
unanimous support for his opinion striking down segregation. As insulting to 
blacks as I find Warren’s opinion in Brown fifty years later, my deep and long
reflections of twenty years as a law professor assures me that striking down 
segregation, even at this cost, was a tremendous bargain for black people. 
Id. at 947. 
294. For an attempt to reconcile Justice Thomas’s traditionalism with his limited
separatism, see infra text accompanying notes 349–49. 
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reasoning, Enlightenment rationalism, and neutral principles of constitutional 
law.”295  Reminiscent of the Wizard of Oz, critical race theorists believe
that appearance can be deceiving and, hence, seek to “understand what is 
going on behind the curtain.”296  Looking behind the curtain, critical race
theorists see a post-civil rights social order that is racially corrupt and has 
been from the very beginning.  Look around and what does one see: whites 
on top, people of color on the bottom.  Everything important in our society
slants in favor of insiders who are overwhelmingly straight white males. 
This racialized social order means that our society is “racist,” a term 
critical race theorists use quite often.  “Racism” means that our society is 
not organically neutral or objective when it comes to matters of race. 
Instead, it is “non-neutral” or “anti-objective,” all of which is socially
constructive. When people think colorblind, they do not see monochrome; 
they see white.297 
Some whites, “critical white theorists,” acknowledge the privilege they 
have in the social order. 
[W]hen I . . . apply for a job[ ]or hunt for an apartment, I don’t look threatening. 
Almost all of the people evaluating me for those things look like me—they are 
white. They see in me a reflection of themselves—and in a racist world that is an
advantage.  I smile.  I am white.  I am one of them.  I am not dangerous.  Even
when I voice critical opinions, I am cut some slack.  After all, I’m white.298 
In response to Justice Holmes’s aphorism, “[t]he life of the law has not 
been logic: it has been experience,” or values,299 critical race theorists can 
be understood to pose the following question: whose values does the law 
tend to vindicate? 
Because it is part of a racially corrupt society, formal equal opportunity 
is necessarily “racist,” critical race theorists insist.  More than just a cog 
or mantelpiece, formal equal opportunity is an integral part of the social 
order, as it protects and perpetuates it.  That, indeed, is the purpose of law: 
295. RICHARDDELGADO &JEANSTEFANCIC,CRITICALRACE THEORY:ANINTRODUCTION 
3 (2d ed. 2012). 
296. Jerry L. Anderson, Law School Enters the Matrix: Teaching Critical Legal Studies, 
54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 201, 210 (2004). 
297. See BROOKS, supra note 9, at 89–108; TIM WISE, DEAR WHITE AMERICA: LETTER 
TO A NEW MINORITY (2012). 
298. Robert Jensen, White Privilege Shapes the U.S.: Affirmative Action for Whites 
is a Fact of Life, BALT. SUN (July 19, 1998), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1998-07­
19/news/1998200115_1_white-privilege-unearned-white-action-for-whites [http://perma.cc/ 
6C6Z-JMFA].
 299. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed. 1963). 
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to maintain the existing social order.  Consequently, formal equal opportunity
does nothing to unstack the deck—to disassemble the constructed racial
hierarchy that inheres in our society—but does everything to legitimize it.
“Formal equal opportunity is thus calculated to remedy at most the more 
extreme and shocking forms of racial treatment; it can do little about the 
business–as–usual types of [racialized conditions] that people of color 
confront every day and that account for much of our subordination,
poverty, and despair.”300  The criticalist critique of formal equal opportunity, 
then, is part of a more general critique of our socio-legal order.301 
Precisely how does formal equal opportunity do its job?  How does it 
protect and perpetuate the socio-legal order? It does so, critical race 
theorists contend, primarily by privileging the perspective of the people 
on top: straight white males, the “insiders.”  Created by insiders, formal
equal opportunity, and, hence, civil rights law, is largely informed by their 
perspective, rather than by the victim’s perspective.  The insider’s ultimate 
aim is to remain on the inside: to stay in power.  This goal is camouflaged
by the use of lofty language like “justice,” “equal protection,” and “due 
process” in legal reasoning.  Such language endows the socio-legal order 
with noble rhetoric, which, in turn, is used to mollify outsiders.  Opium for 
the masses.
Based upon their critique of formal equal opportunity, critical race 
theorists would find juridical subordination when courts write opinions or
render decisions that protect or preserve white hegemony.  Juridical
subordination, in other words, is judicial decision-making that effectively 
privileges insiders.  Hence, from the critical race theory perspective, any
judicial opinion that sustains the existing racial order—the historical
relationship between race and power, or white hegemony—constitutes 
juridical subordination.
To demonstrate how juridical subordination is manifested, critical race 
theorists might cite an example involving the government’s treatment of 
a nonblack “outsider” group, Native Americans.  The government has
used law to rationalize and justify the reduction and eradication of Native 
American land rights.  As Robert Williams notes:
Since its invasion of America, white society has sought to justify, through law and
legal discourse, its . . . aggression against Indian people by stressing tribalism’s 
incompatibility with the superior values and norms of white civilization.  For half
a millennium, the white man’s Rule of Law has most often served as the
 300. Richard Delgado, Recasting the American Race Problem, 79 CALIF. L.  REV. 1389, 
1394 (1991) (reviewing ROY L. BROOKS, RETHINKING THE AMERICAN RACE PROBLEM (1990)). 
301. See BROOKS, supra note 9, at 89–108. 
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fundamental mechanism by which white society has absolved itself  [of] . . . any
injustices arising from its assumed right of domination over Indian people.302 
Juridical subordination is manifested by the fact that, in this case, law 
protects and perpetuates white hegemony over Native Americans—an
“assumed right of domination over Indian peoples.”  Williams finds other 
examples of white hegemony “in the discourses of seventeenth[-]century
Puritan divines, nineteenth[-]century Georgia legislators, and twentieth[-]
century members of Congress, the federal judiciary[,] and the federal executive 
branch.”303 
Critical race theorists would also point to numerous legal doctrines in 
racial preference law and antidiscrimination law that protect or preserve 
white hegemony.  These doctrines are conceived or implemented by the
Supreme Court from the insider’s perspective—the perpetrator’s perspective 
—rather than from the outsider’s perspective—the victim’s perspective.304 
For example, the diversity rationale is one of the permissible governmental 
purposes that sustains race-based affirmative action under the strict
scrutiny test.  Insiders seized upon that rationale as the basis for their support 
of affirmative action in Grutter.305  From the outsider’s perspective, however, 
the diversity rationale is a negative because, critical race theorists argue, 
it sustains white hegemony by diverting the nation’s attention from the 
real reason we need affirmative action—to redress white control and 
power in our mainstream institutions.306  Similarly, in antidiscrimination 
law, the plaintiff is typically required to trace discriminatory acts to a 
here–and–now perpetrator, an existing person or institution, which can be 
held directly responsible for the discrimination.  Critical race theorists 
maintain that this requirement makes it impossible for antidiscrimination 
law to redress societal discrimination, which from the outsider’s point of 
view is a far more debilitating form of discrimination than individual 
302. Robert A. Williams, Jr., Documents of Barbarism: The Contemporary Legacy 
of European Racism and Colonialism in the Narrative Traditions of Federal Indian Law, 
31 ARIZ. L. REV. 237, 277 (1989), reprinted in  CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING
EDGE 94, 103 (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 2d. ed. 2000). 
303. Id., reprinted in CRITICAL RACE THEORY at 103. 
304. The classic scholarship on this point remains Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing 
Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme 
Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978). 
305.  Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 317 (2003). 
306. Derrick A. Bell, Who’s Afraid of Critical Race Theory?, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 
893, 906 (1995). 
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3. Implementing Law
What would civil rights law look like if the Supreme Court attempted 
to avoid juridical subordination in the ways suggested by the post-civil 
rights norms?  If the Court showed absolute devotion to each of the post-
civil rights norms individually—racial omission, racial integration, racial 
solidarity, and social transformation—what might civil rights law begin 
to look like?  We think it might look something like the following. 
a. Traditionalism 
Traditionalists would make certain changes to current racial preference 
and antidiscrimination law so as to guard against the juridical subordination
they identify—suppression of the racial omission tenet.  As to the former,
traditionalists would, at the very least, eliminate race-based affirmative 
action—repeal racial preference law—and, thus, obviate the need for the 
strict scrutiny test, at least for racial classifications.  Indeed, Justice Scalia,
a core traditionalist, argues that race-conscious laws are dangerously 
divisive in a society like ours.  Quoting Professor Bickel’s influential book, 
The Morality of Consent, Justice Scalia writes:
The difficulty of overcoming the effects of past discrimination is as nothing
compared with the difficulty of eradicating from our society the source of those
effects, which is the tendency—fatal to a Nation such as ours—to classify and 
judge men and women on the basis of their country of origin or the color of their
skin.  A solution to the first problem that aggravates the second is no solution at 
all. . . .  “The lesson of the great decisions of the Supreme Court and the lesson
of contemporary history have been the same for at least a generation: discrimination
on the basis of race is illegal, immoral, unconstitutional, inherently wrong, and
destructive of democratic society.”308
 307. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 304, at 1053 (remedying racial discrimination, 
from the victim’s perspective, requires affirmative efforts to change the conditions, rather 
than individual actions); Alan D. Freeman, Race and Class: The Dilemma of Liberal 
Reform, 90 YALE L.J. 1880 (1981) (reviewing DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM, AND
AMERICAN LAW (2d ed. 1980)). 
308.  City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 520–21 (1989) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (quoting ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 133 (1975)). 
Chief Justice Roberts takes a similar position. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v.
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 742 (2007); see also Schuette v. Coal. to Defend 
Affirmative Action, Integration, & Immigration Rights & Fight for Equal. by Any Means 
Necessary, 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014) (no federal authority could bar state constitutional 
amendment prohibiting affirmative action); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 
2411 (2013) (remanding Caucasian student’s suit against a university for discrimination
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Traditionalists have a more complex view of antidiscrimination law.
Antidiscrimination law effectuates the racial omission tenet by prohibiting 
governmental entities and certain private institutions from using race-
conscious policies or practices. A violation of antidiscrimination law is 
triggered when it can be shown that the defendant intentionally used race 
in its decision-making process—intent test—or used an identified facially
neutral policy or practice that, unknown to the defendant, had a racially
disparate impact on a protected class—effects test.  The intentional use of
race means that race was a motivating factor—or under some laws “the 
substantial factor”—in the decision-making process.
To avoid juridical subordination, traditionalists would make any number 
of changes to antidiscrimination law.  High on the list is jettisoning the 
effects test while retaining the intent test.  The latter is acceptable because 
it is narrowly focused on the accused’s racial animus, indicating that race 
really did matter in the action taken.  For that reason, traditionalist judges, 
including Justices Scalia and Thomas, have not hesitated to permit litigation 
to go forward under the intent test in a variety of settings.  In Thompson 
v. North American Stainless, LP, Justice Scalia wrote a unanimous
opinion that upheld the right of a plaintiff to bring a third-party retaliation 
claim under Title VII.309  The plaintiff alleged that he was fired by his
employer three weeks after the plaintiff’s fiancée, who also worked for 
the defendant, filed an EEOC sex discrimination charge against the 
employer.310  Similarly, in Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., Justice Thomas wrote
a unanimous opinion that permitted a former employee to bring an action 
for post-employment retaliation under Title VII against an  employer who 
wrote a bad reference letter even though the statute explicitly applies only
to “an employee or applicant.”311 
Traditionalists, on the other hand, reject the effects test.  They find 
this test to be too broad—too much of a hunting expedition searching for 
racism.  Far from being colorblind, the effects test, they believe, is color-
against her on the basis of race because the Fifth Circuit did not apply strict scrutiny to her 
claims); Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (narrowly tailored admissions program, although race-
conscious, served a compelling interest and was therefore constitutional); J.A. Croson,
Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (holding city failed to show a compelling government interest 
justifying plan requiring contractors to award subcontracts to minorities); Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (applying strict scrutiny to racial
classifications in awarding government contracts). 
309.  562 U.S. 170, 178 (2011). 
310. Id. at 172. 
311.  519 U.S. 337, 339–46 (1997). 
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conscious in that it brings too much attention to the question of race in the 
administration of our antidiscrimination law.  As far as traditionalists are 
concerned, racial animus, unless explicitly shown otherwise, is not
responsible for the plight of blacks.  The problem facing blacks is class-
based, not race-based.  Hence, giving race so much attention makes race 
matter when it really does not, and should not, in our post-civil rights 
society.  The government, especially the courts, ought not to encourage 
plaintiffs in employment discrimination, housing discrimination, voting 
rights, and other antidiscrimination lawsuits to think of ingenious ways to 
imagine the existence of racism or racial discrimination where none 
exist—or at least not enough to matter.  Actions that raise the ghost of
racism can only take the nation down a dangerously divisive path.  Hence, 
the traditionalists on the Supreme Court have not allowed plaintiffs to 
initiate effects-based litigation under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act312 and have otherwise sought to clip the wings of the effects test whenever
possible. Two examples follow. 
In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, the traditionalist justices, over a 
strongly worded dissent by the reformists justices, rejected the female
employees’ claim that the employer’s policy of allowing local supervisors 
to exercise discretionary and subjective decision-making over employment 
matters explained the widespread disparate pay and promotions accorded 
to female employees across the nation.313  The traditionalists could not
find discrimination because, inter alia, Wal-Mart had adopted a written 
policy of nondiscrimination, and plaintiffs failed to identify a specific 
employment practice that produces the gender disparity.314  Similarly, in
Ricci v. DeStefano, the traditionalist justices favored the intent test over
the effects test.315  Plaintiffs were seventeen white firefighters and one
Hispanic firefighter who argued that they were the victims of disparate 
treatment discrimination—intent test—in violation of Title VII when the 
city of New Haven discarded the results of a promotional exam that had 
an adverse impact on the black firefighters who took it—effects test.316 
Fearing a disparate-impact lawsuit, the city threw out the exam results.317 
Over a sharp dissent written by the reformists justices, the traditionalists 
justices ruled that the fear of a lawsuit was not enough to excuse what 
312. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 291–93 (2001). 
313.  131 S. Ct. 2541, 2547–48, 2557 (2011). 
314. Id. at 2553–55. 
315.  557 U.S. 557, 585 (2009). 
316. Id. at 562. 
317. Id. 
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these justices saw as the city’s intentional discrimination.318  The Court
held the city liable under the intent test.319 
b. Reformism 
To avoid the juridical subordination they identify—suppression of the 
racial integration tenet—reformists would make certain changes to current 
racial preference and antidiscrimination law.  With respect to the former,
race-conscious affirmative action would be made a general rule of law.
Affirmative action, thereby, becomes as legitimate under reformism as it 
is illegitimate under traditionalism.  To accomplish that goal, the strict
scrutiny test, against which all voluntary affirmative action plans are 
constitutionally tested, would have to be changed.  Currently, an affirmative 
action plan passes constitutional muster under the strict scrutiny test if it
is narrowly tailored—means test—to serve a compelling governmental 
interest—ends test.320  One way to accommodate more affirmative action 
is to expand the ends prong. In addition to a public institution’s desire to
redress its own discrimination, which is extant law, reformists would 
certainly include the desire to eradicate societal discrimination among the 
acceptable compelling governmental interests.321 
Another candidate for the ends prong that might resonate with reformists
is the simple desire for racial integration.  An affirmative action program 
could satisfy the ends prong—would constitute a compelling governmental 
interest—if the program was established for the purpose of increasing
racial integration within the institution.  This effectively extends the diversity
rationale beyond current law, which limits that rationale to the educational 
context.322  If, for example, a school district wanted to implement an
affirmative action plan not for its student body, but for its work force, it 
could do so without violating the strict scrutiny’s ends prong by demonstrating 
a need to bring more racial diversity to its work force.  Thus, for reformists,
diversity would probably be regarded as a compelling governmental interest 
for purposes of satisfying strict scrutiny’s ends prong in any context. They
 318. Id. at 579–80. 
319. Id. at 593. 
320. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 
103 (amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (Supp. V. 1975)). 
321. See BROOKS, supra note 9, at 44–45. 
322.  Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 306, 328 (2003). 
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might reason that racial democracy is not achieved when blacks experience
their greatest social mobility in sports and music.
From the reformist perspective, the Supreme Court commits juridical
subordination in antidiscrimination law when it fails to deploy this important 
body of civil rights law in ways that foster racial integration in a given 
case. To avoid such juridical subordination in antidiscrimination law, 
reformists would create or modify any and all legal doctrines that supported 
racial integration.  Four examples readily come to mind.  The first is the 
creation of a new litigation model, called the “individual effects test.” This
test provides an easier way of probing institutional discrimination than the
current effects standard, which is group-based.  Second, societal discrimination 
should be made actionable under antidiscrimination law.  Third, the burden
of proof as to the defendant’s state of mind in intentional discrimination 
should be shifted from the plaintiff to the defendant as the latter is in control 
of this evidence and, hence, is in the best position to know the truth regarding
it. Finally, institutions should be allowed to use good-faith efforts to open
opportunities for blacks within their organizations without at the same time
subjecting themselves to litigation or at least liability under the intent test.
The individual effects test is a way to probe institutional discrimination 
effectively.  It allows the plaintiff to establish a prima facie violation of 
antidiscrimination law by proving that he or she, as a member of a 
protected class, was adversely affected by an institution’s facially neutral 
policy or practice, for instance by a college’s heavy reliance on the SAT
or an employer’s written test requirement.  The plaintiff would not have 
to show, as he or she must under the extant effects standard, that the 
facially neutral practice or policy adversely impacts his or her protected
class as a whole.  Such a showing requires complex statistical analysis and
expert witnesses.  Under the reformists’ model, first proposed by Professor 
Richard Zimmer,323 a black job applicant who receives a low score on an
employment test establishes adverse impact, but not necessarily employment 
discrimination.  The plaintiff must then show that a less discriminatory
alternative policy or practice was available to the institution and that the 
institution failed to use it.  The alternative, less discriminatory policy or 
practice must serve the institution’s legitimate interests.  Thus, on-the-job
experience may be a less discriminatory, but equally effective alternative
to assess the applicant’s qualifications as the employer’s written test.  An
applicant might say, “I did not do well on the test, but I have twenty years 
of excellent on–the–job experience.” The use of AP grades in lieu of SAT 
scores may be a less discriminatory alternative for a particular black 
323. BROOKS ET AL., supra note 247, at 510 (quoting Michael J. Zimmer, Individual 
Disparate Impact Law: On the Plain Meaning of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, 30 LOY. U.  
CHI. L.J. 473, 497–98, 500–01, 503 (1999)). 
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college applicant seeking admissions to Harvard.  This approach is somewhat
consistent with current law. An employer sued under Title VII of the 1964 
Civil Rights Act is entitled to rebut the prima facie case based on adversity
to the group by proving that the test was job-related and consistent with 
business necessity.324  If the employer carries this burden, it can still be
held liable if the plaintiff can show the availability of a less-discriminatory
alternative.325 Professor Zimmer’s proposal leaves out the job-related or 
business-necessity defense for the individual effects test.326  He summarizes
this litigation model in the context of employment discrimination: 
[T]his model “requires that the plaintiff prove that she was adversely affected by
an ‘employment practice,’ that an alternative practice exists, and that this alternative 
both would not adversely affect the plaintiff and would serve the employer’s 
legitimate interests.”. . .  Plaintiff establishes an employment practice that
adversely affects her by bringing forth “evidence that the action is consistent with
the way the defendant usually operates and is not ad hoc [a first-time action] or
idiosyncratic.”. . .  The term “employment practice” is to be construed liberally, 
and, as such, includes subjective judgments of supervisors. . .  Plaintiff proves an
alternative employment practice by showing that “other employers either did or
could act regularly on the basis of this proposed practice. It is not enough to show
that an employer could act on it in some exceptional situations.”327 
The Supreme Court may have difficulty accepting an effects test that 
disassociates itself from the idea of systemic discrimination, which is how
the effects test has always been understood.328  Unlike claims of intentional 
discrimination, which invoke the intent test, claims of disparate impact
discrimination are deemed to be cognizable only because they impact the 
entire group of, say, black workers or black college applicants.  Disparate 
impact does not apply to single-plaintiff lawsuits.  The effects test is for
groups; the intent test is for individuals or groups. Hence, the individual 
effects test takes what has traditionally been viewed as a group-oriented 
324. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659–60 (1989). 
325. See id. at 660–61. 
326. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U. S. 299 (1977) (statistics
provided to make prima facie case of discrimination must not rely on practices that were 
not, at the time, illegal).
 327. BROOKS ET AL., supra note 247, at 510 (quoting Zimmer, supra note 323, at 497–98,
500–01, 503). 
328. See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co., 490 U.S. 642 (nonwhite workers could not 
prevail because they had only statistics, rather than evidence of particular hiring practices 
linked to demonstrated adverse impact); Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 433 U.S. 299 (statistics 
provided to make prima facie case of discrimination must not rely on practices that were 
not, at the time, illegal).
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lawsuit and makes it accessible to individual claims of discrimination. 
Reformists might argue that this critical change in law should make the
effects test more successful in doing what it was supposed to have done 
from the beginning—“eliminat[e] the cumulative effects of historical racial 
discrimination.”329  Given the fact that the conventional deployment of the
effects test has had limited success,330 should the Supreme Courts fail to 
adopt the individual effects test where applicable, a reformist would say, the 
Court will have engaged in juridical subordination. 
Allowing for the prosecution of societal discrimination is the second 
reformist measure. 
Societal discrimination, according to the Supreme Court, is “discrimination 
not traceable to its own actions.”331  Michael Selmi defines it as “discrimination 
in the air” or as:
. . . discrimination for which there is no identifiable responsible party, public or
private.  It might alternatively be defined as discrimination that occurred some 
time in the past with an identifiable party that is no longer legally culpable because
the statute of limitations has run or the effects of the discrimination are now too
attenuated to trace. . . .  [S]ocietal discrimination. . . [might include] the lingering
effects of past discrimination. The term may also serve as a surrogate for identifiable 
discrimination in the circumstance where a governmental entity is reluctant to
admit or prove its own discrimination.  Finally, . . . societal discrimination might 
best be seen as the cumulative effects of multiple acts and actors—a combination
of all the factors identified above[.]332 
329. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 247, 262 (2005) (O’Connor, J.,).  In 
discussing the history of disparate impact liability, Justice O’Connor remarked that “the 
Court in Griggs reasoned that disparate impact liability was necessary to achieve Title 
VII’s ostensible goal of eliminating the cumulative effects of historical racial discrimination.”
Id. (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)). 
330. See Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. 
REV. 701 (2006).  In this article, Professor Selmi argues that the disparate impact theory
arose not as a general theory of equality, but more modestly as a device to deal with
specific instances of prior discrimination.  Id. at 705, 708–16.  After reviewing the cases, 
Professor Selmi concludes that the disparate impact theory has had limited success outside 
of written employment tests and that disparate impact is extremely difficult to prove in 
court. Id. at 725, 755–57.  Professor Selmi’s most striking conclusion is that the disparate 
impact theory may have had the unintentional effect of undercutting the disparate treatment
theory by limiting our understanding of what constitutes intentional discrimination. Id. at
767–82. Our concept of intentional discrimination continues to turn on motivation and 
animus. Id. at 701, 782.  The major social mistake of pushing so hard for disparate impact
theory, Professor Selmi argues, was the belief that law could do the work that politics itself
could not—to wit, bring about substantive racial equality. Id. at 707. Professor Selmi 
argues for a greater commitment by society to remedying inequalities. Id. at 770–71. 
331. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 288 (1986) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring); see Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
332. Michael Selmi, Remedying Societal Discrimination Through the Spending Power, 
80 N.C. L. REV. 1575, 1603–04 (2002) (citations omitted). 
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The last definition—the cumulative effects of all forms of prior or current
discrimination, including the lingering effects of slavery and Jim Crow— 
is the most coherent.  It focuses on current discriminatory effects, realizing 
that such effects may have begun with an act of past intentional
discrimination.  This definition also recognizes that societal discrimination,
unlike individual or institutional discrimination, is not likely to have an 
identifiable perpetrator—it is not tied to any particular person or institutional 
practice or policy—although it can certainly affect an individual’s behavior 
or what goes on in an institution.  As the cumulative effects of all 
discrimination in a society, past or present, societal discrimination effectively
identifies society as the perpetrator.  For that reason, according to the Supreme
Court, societal discrimination is not subject to legal redress.  The problem, 
from the Supreme Court’s perspective, is not that societal discrimination does
not exist, but that it is “ageless in [its] reach into the past, and timeless in
[its] ability to affect the future.”333  It is too big to prosecute. 
This, then, means that racial integration is impeded by a form of 
discrimination that the Court lacks the imagination to remedy.  That is yet
another instance of juridical subordination.  Perhaps this form of juridical 
subordination is justified, perhaps not. The point, however, is that it exists, 
and should, at the very least, be acknowledged as such. 
Reformists would certainly make societal discrimination actionable. 
They strongly believe that we should not be hung up on identifying a
perpetrator when all of society is the perpetrator.  “If the past disparities 
are morally illegitimate,” Loury argues, “the propriety of the contemporary
order must also be called into question.”334  One way to make societal 
discrimination actionable is to require institutions to take societal 
discrimination into account as best as they can when formulating 
institutional policies or practices. Failure to do so would make them liable 
to blacks disadvantaged by the institution’s policy or practice.  Thus, to 
avoid liability, the institution would have to consider the ways in which 
its policies or practices are likely to disadvantage blacks affected by such 
policies or practices. For example, prior to administering a promotional 
exam, the employer should run it by blacks within or outside the company 
to get their input as to its racial impact.  Bringing in more people to review 
the exam can bring to light unanticipated problems and avoid charges of 
333. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276 (plurality opinion). 
334. LOURY, supra note 270, at 103; see ROY L. BROOKS, ATONEMENT AND FORGIVENESS: 
A NEW MODEL FOR BLACK REPARATIONS 137–38 (2004). 
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racial unfairness after the exam is given.  Similarly, a state would not 
institute a new Voter ID law requiring a birth certificate when it discovers, 
upon consulting with black community leaders, that a large segment of 
blacks who had been voting for years have no birth certificate simply
because they were born at home at a time when Jim Crow denied them 
access to hospitals. 
Requiring institutions to take societal discrimination into account also
seems fair, reformists might argue, because public and private institutions 
have historically played major roles in creating societal discrimination. 
Accordingly, institutions are much better positioned than individuals to
do something about societal discrimination.  Take, for example, the fact 
that “[t]he typical white family enjoys a net worth that is more than eight 
times that of its black counterpart.”335  This racial disparity, reformists
could argue, is one of the effects of societal discrimination.  It is the 
cumulative effect of historical discrimination against blacks in employment 
markets, housing markets, and educational institutions going back
intergenerationally as far as Jim Crow and even slavery.  Because of the 
inertia of these discriminatory traditions, the typical black family has not 
been able to accumulate an estate to pass down to future generations. 
When poor white immigrants were starting out in this country from the 
1890s to the 1940s, scores of young black men were falsely imprisoned 
for long terms under local vagrancy laws in the South.  This was “slavery 
by another name,” to borrow from Douglas A. Blackmon’s wonderful 
book on the subject.336  Then there were the Jim Crow laws and practices 
that targeted blacks in both the North and South.  Thus, unlike white 
immigrants, generations of blacks had no ability to acquire or accumulate 
an estate that could be passed down to children, grandchildren, and future 
generations. “Some economists estimate that up to [eighty] percent of 
lifetime wealth accumulation results from gifts from earlier generations, 
ranging from the down payment on a home to a bequest by a parent.”337 
If a college, for example, did not take this demonstration of societal 
discrimination into account when creating a financial aid package for a 
black student, who is likely the first in his family to go to college, that 
action would be the basis for a lawsuit under antidiscrimination law governing 
educational institutions, such as Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
335. Dalton Conley, Opinion, The Cost of Slavery, N.Y.TIMES (Feb. 15, 2003), http://www. 
nytimes.com/2003/02/15/opinion/the-cost-of-slavery.html [http://perma.cc/6M3V-D3QJ].
 336. DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT
OF BLACK AMERICANS FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II (First Anchor Books 2009) 
(2008).
 337. Conley, supra note 335; see Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 344–46 (2003) 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring) (discussing slavery’s educational legacy). 
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Although the institution is not directly responsible for societal discrimination, 
it has a civil rights duty not only to be knowledgeable about the force and 
effect of such discrimination, but also to do something about it.
The reformist attempt to make societal discrimination actionable will
place an unprecedented major burden on institutions.  Each institution 
would have to be aware of the country’s racial history, not a bad idea, and
the impact that history has had on each applicant or person with whom it
deals. Is this an instance where the cure—making societal discrimination 
actionable—is worse than the disease—juridical subordination?  We think 
not. One of the duties of living in a diverse society is to know something 
about how one’s fellow citizens live.338 
The next reformist proposal focuses on the intent test.  It places the burden 
of proof regarding the defendant’s intent on the defendant itself, rather 
than on the plaintiff.  Under current law, the burden of proof is on the 
plaintiff.339  Reformists would have the plaintiff carry the initial burden of
bringing forth credible evidence of discrimination, direct or circumstantial.
But once this burden is satisfied, the burdens of production and persuasion 
would then shift to the defendant to disprove the inference of discrimination 
that arises from the plaintiff’s prima facie case.  As the critical question
raised in the plaintiff’s prima facie case concerns the defendant’s state of 
mind, and given the fact that the defendant is in the best position to know 
its own state of mind, shifting the burden of persuasion with respect to
that element of proof on the defendant seems fair and reasonable.340 
A good faith efforts standard is the final reformist proposal we have 
identified here.  This reform would give institutions a safe harbor in creating 
policies and practices that promote racial integration.  Civil rights law is 
very complex and shifts from time to time and judge to judge.  Institutions 
are not always sure that they are in compliance.  What they fear most is 
being sued for violating the law and the expense and bad publicity that 
accompany such lawsuits.  A good faith efforts standard would give 
institutions legal assurance that they will not be sued, or at least held liable,
for their good faith efforts in creating opportunities for integrating their 
organizations.  If there is no invidious intent associated with the formulation
 338. See supra note 242 and accompanying text (discussing Voter ID laws). 
339. See, e.g., Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 49 (2003) (citing McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 
Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000). 
340. See, e.g., BROOKS, supra note 209, at 55–57 (discussing the difficulty of prosecuting
a disparate treatment claim).
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or execution of their policies and practices, and if their intent was to open 
doors for racial minorities, then institutions would be immune from liability 
under either the intent or effects test. 
In sum, a belief in the potency of racism and the ubiquity of racial 
discrimination in today’s society—race still matters—is at the core of the 
reformist post-civil rights perspective. This suggests that reformists would 
view racial preference and antidiscrimination law vastly different not only
from traditionalists, but also from current civil rights law, which, in most
respects, correlates with traditionalism in its application.  Reformists would 
want more affirmative action and more expansive ways of probing structural
and individual discrimination.  Such changes to racial preference law 
underscore the importance that reformists attach to the racial integration tenet.
They place more emphasis on the racial integration tenet than on the racial 
omission tenet.  Conceptually, both tenets are sound; but operationally,
the racial integration tenet should trump the racial omission tenet.  To borrow 
from Justice Holmes again, reformists believe that formal equal opportunity 
need not be “killed” as it can be “tamed” and made a “useful animal.”341 
c. Limited Separation 
To avoid juridical subordination, which limited separatists define as the 
suppression of racial identity or solidarity, the Supreme Court will have 
to move beyond the racial omission and racial integration tenets. Indeed, 
limited separatists would want the Supreme Court to do something it has 
steadfastly refused to do—distinguish between involuntary racial isolation 
that subordinates and stigmatizes—racial segregation—and voluntary
racial isolation that supports and empowers—racial separation.342  In Brown, 
the Supreme Court in one broad sweep ruled that, “[s]eparate educational
facilities are inherently unequal.”343  More recently, Chief Justice Roberts
elides the distinction between racial segregation and racial separation
because he believes that judges should not be too confident in their 
“ability to distinguish good from harmful governmental uses of racial
criteria.”344  To that claim, a limited separatist would respond: even a dog 
knows the difference between being kicked and stumbled over.
Scholars such as Robert Smith suggest that it is quite possible to
“delink” racial separation “from the justificatory ideology of white 
341. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
 342. See, e.g., ROY L. BROOKS, INTEGRATION OR SEPARATION?: A STRATEGY FOR RACIAL
EQUALITY 12, 117 (1996) (discussing the “warts” of Brown, including its overly broad
holding). 
343.  Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
344.  Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U. S. 701, 742
(2007). 
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supremacy.”345  Racial separation is “theoretically, empirically, and politically 
relevant.”346 Even Chief Justice Roberts’ African American brethren, Justice
Clarence Thomas, understands the limited separatist take on racial isolation: 
“Racial isolation” itself is not a harm; only state-enforced segregation is.  After
all, if separation itself is a harm, and if integration therefore is the only way that
blacks can receive a proper education, then there must be something inferior 
about blacks. Under this theory, . . . [separation] injures blacks because blacks, 
when left on their own, cannot achieve.  To my way of thinking, that conclusion
is the result of a jurisprudence based upon a theory of black inferiority.347 
As it has been said, a black child does not have to sit next to a white child 
to get a quality education.
At first glance, it may appear that Justice Thomas is contradicting his 
strong embrace of the racial omission tenet put forth principally in Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena348 and Grutter v. Bollinger.349  But it may be
possible to hold both positions—racial omission and limited racial separation 
—if the latter is viewed as an exception to the former. Indeed, this is 
probably how limited separatists would do a doctrinal end-around formal 
equal opportunity.
Thus, to avoid juridical subordination unearthed through the limited 
separatist perspective, the standards for determining liability under racial
preference law would have to at least be supplemented to permit blacks 
and other similarly situated groups to create positive, racially identifiable 
institutions with governmental assistance if need be.  There is no way to 
accommodate racial solidarity, or limited separation, within the terms of
the strict scrutiny test, which is designed to support the racial omission
tenet. Racial solidarity has both the intent and the effect of sanctioning 
race-conscious decision-making, undermining the racial omission tenet, 
as well as legitimizing racial isolation, undermining the racial integration 
tenet. Hence, at the very least a new constitutional test would have to be 
developed as an exception to extant civil rights law. The racial omission
and racial integration tenets would have to coexist with this new test. 
345. ROBERT C. SMITH, RACISM IN THE POST-CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: NOW YOU SEE IT, 
NOW YOU DON’T 2 (1995).
 346. Id. 
347.  Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 122 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
348.  Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
349.  Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
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Limited separatists have, in fact, set forth a three-prong test that establishes
conditions for determining the legality of racial classifications specifically
created for the purpose of achieving racial solidarity: 
First, the group seeking [the racial classification] . . . must be able to demonstrate
the need for a supportive environment free of debilitating racism or, in the case 
of gender, sexism.  If our mainstream institutions practice the type of racial [control 
over] other groups that they do [over] African Americans, if other groups can
point to educational, socioeconomic, or political disadvantage due to race or
gender, then they satisfy the first condition.  White males will have a difficult
time meeting this condition because even the “angry” ones are not disadvantaged
on account of their race or gender[.]
Second, [the racial classification] . . . must not unnecessarily trammel the interests of
other individuals or groups.  This means that gratuitous discrimination is prohibited. 
[Racially identifiable institutions] . . . must grant access to individuals from outside 
the group, so long as these individuals are willing to support the institution’s primary
objectives.  For example, a white student should be allowed to attend an Historically
Black College or University . . . so long as he understands that the institution’s
primary objective is to attend to the special educational needs of African American 
students. Likewise, an African American lawyer should be allowed to practice 
law in a small Korean law firm so long as she understands that the law firm’s 
primary objective is to service the surrounding Korean community, and a Latino
graduate of Harvard Business School should not be denied employment with a 
Wall Street investment banking firm so long as it is understood that the primary
objective of the firm is to service large, multinational corporations. 
Third, the only time an individual can be denied an opportunity on account of his
or her race (or gender)—the only time a restrictive classification can be used—is 
when race (or gender) is a bona fide selection qualification “reasonably necessary
to the normal operation of the particular [institution],” to borrow from analogous
civil rights law. Race, for example, would constitute a bona fide selection
qualification . . . if an African American institution were in danger of losing its
identity or focus by the admission or hiring of an additional white applicant[.]350 
Governed by the three-prong test, limited separation does not reintroduce
the separate–but–equal civil rights policy into racial relations.  Not only 
is racial integration treated as a legitimate alternative to limited separation,
allowing African Americans and other racial groups to pursue both racial 
strategies depending on individual-needs racial circumstances, but limited
separatist organizations can themselves be racially integrated.  True, a black 
organization or community could bar further integration so as to maintain
its racial character.  But neither the organization nor the community could
ban all integration.  Limited separation is not total separation, the latter of 
which would be a violation of constitutional and statutory law under the 
three-prong test. 
350. BROOKS, supra note 342, at 191–92. 
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In the end, then, limited separatists would give African Americans three 
equally valid strategies for racial advancement—racial omission, racial 
integration, and limited separation. The Supreme Court, thereby, treats 
limited separation pari passu with the racial omission and racial integration 
tenets.  Formal equal opportunity is the general rule and limited separation 
is the exception. The strict scrutiny test governs racial preference law 
except when beneficial forms of racial isolation are at issue, in which case 
the three-prong test applies.351  As a comprehensive formula for judicial 
support of the black equality interest, formal equal opportunity is conceptually 
unsound. But working in conjunction with limited separation, it makes 
sense, limited separatists would argue. 
d. Critical Race Theory 
What changes in civil rights law should the Supreme Court make in
order to avoid juridical subordination as defined by critical race 
theorists—suppression of social transformation?  Derrick Bell suggests 
that the Court must undergo “a change of perspective.”352  The Supreme
Court, must begin to view “racial problems . . . from the perspective 
of minority groups, rather than [from] a white perspective.”353  The most 
direct way for the justices to acquire this mindset is to replace the strict
scrutiny test in racial preference law and the intent or effects in 
antidiscrimination law with what can be called the “white-hegemony
test.” In other words, rather than banning racial classifications that do not 
satisfy the strict scrutiny test or prohibiting discrimination “because of 
race or color,” the Court should strike down private or public policies or
practices under our civil rights laws only if they protect or preserve white 
hegemony.  In parallel fashion, the Court should issue rulings calculated
toward dismantling white hegemony.  These socially transformative rulings 
effectuate a fundamental restructuring of a society that is heavily slanted
in favor of insiders, critical race theorists would argue. This complex
argument hangs on a simple proposition: given our anti-objective society,
justice requires overcompensation in the opposite direction to balance
351. This is similar to the application of a different level of scrutiny that the Supreme 
Court applies to gender classifications. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 
524 (1996) (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)). 
352. Bell, supra note 306, at 906 (quoting Daniel A. Farber, The Outmoded Debate 
over Affirmative Action, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 893, 904 (1994)). 
353. Id. at 906–07 (quoting Farber, supra note 352, at 904). 
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things out. This proposition is similar to the sentiment offered by Supreme 
Court Justice Harry Blackmun years ago: “In order to get beyond racism, 
we must first take account of race.  There is no other way.”354 
The most direct way to determine whether a Supreme Court ruling protects 
or preserves white hegemony is to ask whether the court’s opinion or decision 
enhances white, or insider, privilege. Peggy McIntosh defines white privilege
in a famous passage:
I have come to see white privilege as an invisible package of unearned assets 
that I can count on cashing in each day, but about which I was “meant” to remain
oblivious. White privilege is like an invisible weightless knapsack of special
provisions, assurances, tools, maps, guides, codebooks, passports, visas, clothes, 
compass, emergency gear, and blank checks.355 
The “cultural meaning” test is another way to detect white hegemony in
an opinion.  This test is also a way to privilege the outsider’s perspective. It
asks, for example, what does it mean in the African American culture “to 
construct a barrier between all-white and all-black sections of Memphis.”356 
The meaning African Americans would attach to this wall is very different 
from what they would assign to, say, an employer’s requirement that its 
truck drivers carry a valid driver’s license.  Even if the latter disadvantaged
African American applicants because many of them did not have a valid 
driver’s license, it would not necessarily indicate an assumed right of 
white domination over African Americans.  Protecting hate speech would 
fail the cultural meaning test as well, because speech is a form of domination. 
Hate speech says that whites can say whatever they want to blacks.  Hate 
speech reinforces white hegemony.357 
Critical race theorists, in short, would want the Supreme Court to use 
its institutional authority to chip away at white hegemony.  Each civil 
rights decision should aim to dismantle the white power structure in our 
354. DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note 295, at dedication (quoting Justice Harry
Blackmun). 
355. Peggy McIntosh, White Privilege and Male Privilege: A Personal Account of
Coming To See Correspondences Through Work in Women’s Studies, in  POWER, 
PRIVILEGE AND LAW: A  CIVIL RIGHTS READER 23 (Leslie Bender & Dan Braveman eds., 
1995) (emphasis added); see supra, text accompanying note 298. 
356. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 355, 357, 365 (1987). 
357. See Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist 
Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 471 (1990); Richard Delgado, Words That 
Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 133, 178 (1982); see also  CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS (1993)
(arguing the use of the First Amendment to protect intimidation, subordination, terrorism,
and discrimination).  See generally, MARI J. MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND: 
CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1993) (examining
assaultive speech). 
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society as much as possible.  Just as a good doctor would treat the problem 
rather than just the symptoms, the Supreme Court, critical race theorists 
believe, should treat the problem rather than the symptom.  The Court 
does this through social transformation; in other words, by attempting to
change the relationship between race and power in the social order. 
CONCLUSION 
Juridical subordination—the suppression of the black equality interest
in civil rights cases358—makes the Supreme Court an object of civil rights
inquiry.  This is how it should be, given the Court’s long history of racial 
harm prior to Brown as well as the racially impeding decisions made after
Brown, starting with Brown II.359  Plain and simple, Supreme Court decisions
affect the wellbeing of African Americans.  As Justice Thurgood Marshall
has said: “What is striking is the role legal principles have played throughout 
America’s history in determining the condition of Negroes.”360  In Brown, 
the Court reversed course but has not always stayed on course since. 
Avoiding juridical subordination is, in our view, the best way for the Court 
to remain on course. 
But, as we have shown, the determination of juridical subordination is 
rather indeterminate. There is more than one legitimate way to define the 
black equality interest in civil rights law in civil rights cases.361  This does
not surprise us; for, as Holmes has observed, behind every decision “lies 
a judgment as to the relative worth and importance of competing legislative
grounds, often an inarticulate and unconscious judgment, it is true, and yet
the very root and nerve of the whole proceeding.”362 We have identified the
post-civil rights norms—racial omission, racial integration, racial solidarity, 
and social transformation—as “competing legislative grounds” in the 
discourse on juridical subordination.363 
Several questions arise from that application.  How much difference is 
there between civil rights decisions that attempt to avoid juridical subordination 
—decisions that give maximum attention to racial advancement based on 
358. See supra Part II. 
359. See supra Introduction, Part I.A. 
360. Thurgood Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution, 
101 HARV. L. REV. 1, 5 (1987). 
361. See supra Part II.B. 
362. Holmes, supra note 341, at 466. 
363. See Brooks, supra note 219. 
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any one of the post-civil rights norms—and conventional civil rights 
decisions—decisions that take account of federalism, comity, and other 
competing referents?  Is there a way to reconcile the competing post-civil 
rights norms to produce a single standard? What are the social costs— 
institutional and in terms of racial relations—associated with judicial
efforts that give top priority to black advancement?  Are we asking the Court
to engage in a dangerously progressive enterprise, similar to what it did in 
Brown, albeit obviously less revolutionary?  Is there a limit to what the 
law can do for racial advancement?  If juridical subordination is unavoidable, 
we may be faced with the sense, if not the reality, that uneven individual 
success is all that African Americans can hope for in our post-civil rights
society; that, with the death of Jim Crow, we have reached a permanent
glass ceiling on racial advancement for black Americans as a whole. 
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